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En France, avoir plus de deux enfants a un effet causal négatif sur l’offre de travail des mères. 
Cet article pose la question de savoir si certaines politiques familiales altèrent cet effet. L’idée 
est qu’en améliorant les conditions de la conciliation entre vie familiale et vie professionnelle, 
les  politiques  familiales  peuvent  réduire  l’effet  négatif  d’avoir  plus  de  deux  enfants  sur 
l’activité des mères. A l’inverse, certaines politiques familiales peuvent accroître cet effet en 
incitant davantage les mères à avoir une stratégie d’entrée et de sortie du marché du travail 
suivant  les  périodes  de  leur  vie,  plutôt  que  de  concilier  simultanément  responsabilités 
familiales et professionnelles. Concrètement, nous nous sommes intéressés à deux types de 
politique familiale : le congé parental d’éducation rémunéré et l’offre de garde pour les jeunes 
enfants. Afin de pouvoir mesurer l’effet de ces politiques familiales, nous avons repéré des 
changements  temporels  ou  des  différences  spatiales  de  ces  politiques  qui  modifient  les 
conditions dans lesquelles les décisions individuelles sont prises.  Dans un premier temps, 
nous trouvons qu’après l’extension de l’Allocation parentale d’éducation aux parents de deux 
enfants (dont un de moins de trois ans) en juillet 1994, c’est-à-dire au moment où les familles 
de  deux  et  plus  de  deux  enfants  ont  la  même  possibilité  de  prendre  un  congé  parental 
d’éducation rémunéré, avoir plus de deux enfants n’a plus d’effet négatif sur la probabilité 
d’activité des mères. Et cela concerne en particulier les femmes jeunes et ayant un diplôme 
inférieur  ou  égal  au  baccalauréat,  qui  se  trouvent  être  les  principales  bénéficiaires  de  la 
mesure. Dans un second temps, en utilisant l’hétérogénéité dans la distribution géographique 
des taux de scolarisation en maternelle à deux ans, nous trouvons qu’accroître l’offre de garde 
peu coûteuse, voire gratuite, modifie l’effet de la fécondité sur l’offre de travail des mères et 
semble aider les mères de jeunes enfants à mieux concilier vie familiale et vie professionnelle 
mais nos estimations sont moins convaincantes.
Mots clés: fécondité, offre de travail des mères, politiques familiales.
In France, having more than two children has a causal negative impact on mothers’ labour 
supply. The question addressed in this paper is whether some family policies alter this effect. 
The idea  is  that  by improving the  conditions  of  the  conciliation between family life  and 
professional life, family policies could reduce the negative impact of having more than two 
children on mothers’ participation. Conversely, some family policies could increase this effect 
by inciting mothers  to  have an entry-exit  strategy on the labour  market  according to  the 
different  periods  of  their  lives,  rather  than  to  reconcile  family  and  professional 
responsibilities. To address this issue, we focus on two different types of family policy: the 
paid parental leave and the supply of child care for young kids. To measure the effect of these 
family policies, we have spotted temporal or spatial changes that modify the conditions in 
which individual decisions are taken. Firstly, we show that after the July 1994 extension of 
the Allocation parentale d’éducation to parents of two children (among which one is less than 
three years old), that  is when families of two and more than two children have the same 
incentive  to  take  a  paid  parental  leave,  having  more  than  two  children  has  no  longer  a 
negative effect on the participation probability of mothers. In addition, this is particularly true 
for young women having no more than the school-leaving certificate, which happen to be the 
main  beneficiaries  of  the  benefit.  Secondly,  using  the  heterogeneity  in  the  geographical 
distribution of two-years-old in pre-elementary public schools, we find that supplying mothers 
of two years old children with developed child care modifies the effect of fertility on mothers’ 
labour supply and seems to help mothers to better conciliate family and professional life but 
our estimates are less convincing. 
Key words: fertility, women’s participation in the labour market, family policies.
JEL: J13, J22.
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« Reconciling work and family life involves two key goals for both individuals and society: 
being able to work, to earn an income while participating in the most important social activity 
of  modern life,  and providing the best  care  and nurturing for  one’s  own children.  These 
aspirations need not be mutually exclusive. A failure to balance work and care commitments 
has implications for either labour force or family decisions - or for both. Parents - or would-be 
parents - may decide to delay having children, have fewer than they really want, or not have 
children at all. Or they may change their labour market behaviour. Some who are out of the 
labour market, either short or long term, prefer to look after their children full-time, regardless 
of  employment  opportunities.  But  others would like to  work,  or work more -  but  cannot 
because they cannot get the childcare services they need in order to continue their careers. 
Still  others  work longer  than they want,  putting their  family under  strain,  in  some cases 
resulting in broken relationships or young people being neglected or poorly raised. »3
This is the reason why conciliation policies are a major issue of family policy. It must 
solve the potentially conflicting trade-off between fertility and activity by making it possible 
for parents to work and to have the number of children they want. In order to achieve these 
objectives, family policies can support fertility and/or labour supply, or act on the terms of the 
trade-off between the two by helping parents to continue working. It is necessary to assess the 
impact of family policies’ current measures on the number of children and on mothers’ labour 
supply who are the most concerned by conciliation difficulties. But it is also important to 
evaluate how family policies influence the link between the number of children and mothers’ 
labour supply, which is the objective of this paper.
Supporting parents’ fertility decisions and mothers’ labour supply decisions is all the 
more important since France is facing since the seventies both a decrease in fertility4 and a 
rise in women’s participation in the labour market. Both these objectives are essential. On the 
one hand, family policies aiming at increasing fertility are necessary to reach a level above the 
one that ensures generation renewal. On the other hand, supporting women’s labour supply is 
optimal from an economic point of view since, as Pierre-Alain Muet notes in introduction of 
the Conseil d’Analyse Economique’s report on gender equality5, « la participation des femmes 
3 “Babies  and  Bosses  -  Reconciling  Work  and  Family  Life”  (2002),  volume  1:  Australia,  Denmark,  The 
Netherlands; OECD.
4 According to the INED (Sardon, 2006), the French indicator of fertility has decreased between 1975 et 1990, 
and risen slightly since: it was 2.47 in 1970 ; 1.95 in 1980 ; 1.78 in 1990 ; 1.87 in 2002 ; 1.88 in 2003 and 1.91 in 
2004.  In  comparison,  the average level for Europe 15  is respectively:  2.38 ;  1.82 ;  1.57 ;  1.50 ;  1.52 ;  1.55. 
Hence,  the  French  indicator  of  fertility  is  traditionally  high,  but  with  a  level  that  stayed  long  below  the 
generation renewal rate (2.1),  France is  confronted with,  as the other European countries,  the ageing of its 
population. In 2006, the French indicator of fertility was above two children per women.
5 Majnoni d’Intignano (1999).
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à l’activité économique est un puissant facteur d’amélioration des performances économiques 
des pays développés parce qu’elle permet la diversification des talents et oriente la demande 
des ménages vers des services … à fort contenu en emploi ». Also, in the next years, massive 
retiring  will  create  a  labour  shortage  and  women’s  labour  supply  will  be  essential. 
Governments  face  two  major  issues  that  are  potentially  contradictory:  stimulate  fertility 
without calling into question mothers’ participation in the labour market.
The  contradiction  between  these  two  public  policies  objectives  comes  from  the 
negative impact of fertility on French mothers’ labour supply. In France, women with the 
lowest number of children are also the ones with the highest participation rate in the labour 
market.  To  what  extent  having  an  additional  child  reduces  the  mother’s  probability  to 
participate in the labour market? As Angrist and Evans (1998) on American Data, Moschion 
(2007) uses a source of exogenous and random variation of fertility to measure the causal 
effect of fertility on French mothers’ labour supply. French parents with same sex siblings 
have a higher probability of having a third child, and among them, mothers’ participation in 
the labour market is reduced. Because sex mix is randomly assigned and because it has an 
effect on participation only through its  impact  on the probability of having a third child, 
Moschion (2007) produces instrumental variable estimates of the causal influence of having 
more than two children on mothers’ participation in the labour market. Results indicate that 
having more than two children reduces significantly the mothers’ participation probability and 
the hours worked per week. Also, having more than two children has a stronger negative 
effect on the labour supply of mothers having no more than the school-leaving certificate, 
which happen to be the main beneficiaries of the benefit. At the same time, having more than 
two children has no effect on fathers’ labour supply. Insofar as having more than two children 
reduces mothers’ labour supply, how can family policies encourage families to have more 
children and mothers to stay on the labour market?
On  the  one  hand,  historically,  French  family  policies  favoured  either  fertility  or 
mothers’  labour  supply,  but  not  both  simultaneously.  Until  1962,  the  family  policy  was 
viewed in an opposition perspective between birth rate and women’s work: the objective was 
fertility and not women’s participation in the labour market. Since 1962, the family policy 
tends less to oppose fertility and women’s work. However, by becoming less generous, family 
policies may have had the opposite effect of policies trying to boost fertility, and may have 
forced  mothers  who  would  have  preferred  to  take  care  of  their  children  to  work  out  of 
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financial  necessity.  Today,  it  seems  that  the  right  balance  between  measures  permitting 
temporary  withdrawals  of  the  labour  market  and  those  permitting  to  reconcile  work  and 
family life has not yet been found. In fact, among the working population, nearly 40% find 
that their work makes the organisation of family life difficult, percentage that reaches 50% 
among parents of children under 11 (Garner, Méda and Sénik, 2004). We analyse in the first 
section how French family policies may have an effect on the conciliation opportunities and 
thus on mothers’ labour supply.
On the other hand, stimulating fertility while supporting mothers’ labour supply can 
represent a challenge because of the negative correlation between the number of children and 
mothers’ labour supply: having more than two children reduces mothers’ participation in the 
labour  market.  As  a  result,  family  policies  having  a  positive  effect  on  one  of  these  two 
variables may have a negative effect on the second one. For example, a policy that stimulates 
fertility may reduce mothers’ labour supply. In this context, it seems that policies acting on 
the terms of the trade-off between fertility and activity are more relevant than those trying to 
support either fertility or activity, at the risk of penalising the second. Conciliation policies 
must make motherhood and professional life compatible.
We ask ourselves if some family policies could alter this negative impact of having 
more than two children on mothers’ participation in the labour market. This effect that differs 
in time (Foley and York, 2005) and space (Angrist and Evans, 1998,  Chun and Oh, 2002) 
could result from policies favouring more or less the conciliation between work and family 
life. The idea is that by improving the conditions of the conciliation between family life and 
professional life, family policies could reduce the negative impact of having more than two 
children on mothers’ participation. Conversely, some family policies could increase this effect 
by inciting mothers  to  have an entry-exit  strategy on the labour  market  according to  the 
different  periods  of  their  lives,  rather  than  to  reconcile  family  and  professional 
responsibilities. 
To address  this  issue,  we focus  on  two different  types  of  family  policy:  the  paid 
parental leave and the supply of child care for young kids. To measure the effect of these 
family policies, we have spotted temporal or spatial changes that modify the conditions in 
which individual decisions are taken, but do not change anything else. Particularly, we have 
analysed the consequences of the July 1994 extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation 
to  parents  of  two  children  (among  which  one  is  less  than  three  years  old),  and  the 
geographical  distribution of  two-years-old in  pre-elementary public  schools.  We focus  on 
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mothers having at  least two children for several  reasons.  Firstly,  the more the number of 
children increases,  the more conciliation problems are obvious. Second, the family policy 
traditionally benefited families with three children or more6. Lastly, insofar as we will use 
instrumental variables to measure the causal effect of fertility on mothers’ labour supply, the 
scope of the analysis  is  restricted to mothers with at  least  two children (the instrumental 
variable  being the sex of  the two eldest  siblings).  This will  make it  possible to  compare 
explicitly the consequences of passing from two to more than two children.
In July 1994, the  Allocation parentale d’éducation  was extended to parents of two 
children.  This  policy  has  entirely  modified  the  financial  incentives  of  mothers  with  two 
children (among which one is less than three years old): if the youngest is born before July 
1994, his mother receives no benefit,  whereas if he is  born after,  she receives a monthly 
benefit of about 450 euros. As this modification was introduced in one go, it constitutes an 
exogenous shock that enables us to grasp the effect of the Allocation parentale d’éducation on 
the possibilities for parents to conciliate family and professional life. We try to measure how 
the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation to parents of two children modified the 
terms of the choice between fertility and mothers’ participation in the labour market. More 
precisely, we examine if by reducing the treatment differences between two and three children 
families, the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation has created a negative effect of 
having a second child on mothers’ participation and if the negative effect of having more than 
two children has disappeared. We find that after the extension of the  Allocation parentale  
d’éducation, that is when families of two and more than two children are in the same position 
to take a paid parental leave, having more than two children has no longer a negative effect on 
the participation probability of mothers. In addition, this is particularly true for young women 
having no more than the school-leaving certificate, which happen to be the main beneficiaries 
of the benefit.
The geographical  distribution  in  pre-elementary public  schools  of  two-years-old  is 
extremely heterogeneous across French departments: it varies in 2005 between 4% and 66%. 
Supposing that this distribution is exogenous, we use it to estimate if supplying mothers of 
two years  old  children  with  developed child  care  could  modify  the  effect  of  fertility  on 
mothers’  labour supply.  On the sample of mothers with at  least  two children and among 
which one is two years old, our estimates are non significant but go the right way: we find that 
in departments  where two years old have a  low access to pre-elementary public schools, 
6 This is less true since the extension in 1994 of the  Allocation parentale d’éducation  to the parents of two 
children, and the progressive replacement of it by the Complément de libre choix d’activité in 2004. Since then, 
the relative advantage of parents with three children was reduced: today, parents with one child can take a paid 
parental leave for six months, and parents with two children for three years. 
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having more than two children has a negative impact on the participation probability and 
hours worked by mothers. On the contrary, in departments where two years old have a high 
access to pre-elementary public schools, having more than two children has a positive impact 
on the participation probability and hours worked by mothers. In order to know if this non 
significance of the results is rather due to the imprecision of the estimates or to the fact that 
offering  developed  child  care  to  mothers  with  two  years  old  children  has  no  effect  on 
mothers’ labour supply, we produced variants of the previous exercise. Particularly, when we 
extend our sample to mothers with at least two children among which one is aged two to ten, 
the estimates are non significant in the departments where two years old have a high access to 
pre-elementary public schools, whereas in departments where two years old have a low access 
to pre-elementary public schools, having more than two children has a significant negative 
impact on mothers’  participation probability.  We find the same results  when second twin 
births are used as an instrument. These results seem to demonstrate that supplying mothers of 
two years old children with affordable child care enables them to better conciliate family and 
professional life. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with caution, because the 
two last exercises that exhibit a significant estimate, both set a problem: the sample in which 
the child is aged two to ten because families could have moved between the period when the 
child was two and the moment the family was surveyed, and the use of twin births because the 
results on this sub-sample are hardly expandable to all mothers with two years old children. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next Section provides a discussion of 
how the different family policies could affect the terms of the conciliation between family and 
professional life. Section II provides a short discussion of related literature and Section III 
describes the data. Section IV shows that the French paid parental leave explains the negative 
impact  of  having more than two children on mothers’  labour  supply.  Section V provides 
several pieces of evidence suggesting that supplying mothers of two years old children with 
affordable child care helps them to better conciliate family and professional life. Last section 
concludes.
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I. A comparative analysis of European Family policies
The objective of this section is to analyse the potential effect of French family policies 
on the conciliation between work and family life. We are particularly interested in policies 
that either explicitly favour the conciliation between work and family life,  or that has an 
indirect effect on it (for example by stimulating fertility, some measures may have a negative 
effect on mothers’ labour supply). Do French family policies facilitate the accumulation of 
familial and professional responsibilities?
In the European Union, most women are active (Table 2). Yet, women’s activity rate 
is much higher in Scandinavian countries than in southern countries. Besides, table 2 clearly 
illustrates a paradox: it is in countries where women’s activity rate is the highest that fertility 
is  also  high  (Finland,  Norway,  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Island),  whereas  conversely  in 
countries  where  the  activity  rate  is  low,  fertility  is  low as  well  (Italy,  Hungary,  Greece, 
Spain). Whereas the relationship between female labour supply and fertility is negative at the 
individual level, it is now positive at the country level. At the individual level, the negative 
correlation  between  women’s  labour  supply  and  the  number  of  children  differs  accross 
countries.  In  addition  to  cultural  differences,  family  policies  could  partly  explain  these 
differences:  by facilitating the conciliation between work and family life,  some countries 
could manage to stimulate at the same time women’s labour supply and fertility.
Aliaga (2005) notes that in almost all member states, the employment rate of women 
decreases with the number of children whereas that of men does not vary much. Particularly, 
mothers with three children or more have a very low employment rate: the difference between 
the employment rate of one child’s mothers and that of three children’s mothers is especially 
high in Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia where the employment rate of mothers with 
at least three children is below 30%. According to her study, regarding women’s employment 
rate according to the presence, number and age of children, France is in an average position in 
Europe: the activity of French women is negatively correlated with the number and the youth 
of  children,  but  their  employment  rate  is  never  particularly  high  or  low.  It  is  therefore 
necessary to identify policies that do not facilitate the conciliation between work and family 
life in order to correct them and reduce the trade-off between working and having the number 
of children one wants. 
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Comparing France with other European countries, we identify some of the elements of 
French family policies that could have an effect on the conciliation between work and family 
life, that is which modify the link between fertility and mothers’ labour supply. All references 
to foreign measures come from Drew’s (2005) study for the European Council.
The  current  measures  of  family  policy  that  are  linked  to  conciliation  matters  are 
essentially of two orders: the compensated parental leave and child care. However, we will 
see that some measures rather favour an alternation between work and family life than a real 
conciliation.  According  to  Thévenon  (2004),  during  the  eighties  and  the  nineties,  some 
measures were put in place, some of them to help mothers to better conciliate work and family 
life,  and  others  to  reduce  their  labour  supply.  Thus,  child  care  investments  and  benefits 
facilitated women’s work, but the creation and then extension of the  Allocation parentale  
d’éducation (compensated parental leave) encouraged mothers of at least three, and in 1994 of 
two children to leave the labour market. The coexistence of these two tendencies results from 
a compromise because the State tries to encourage women to work full time (even if they have 
a first child), while it incites mothers of larger families to withdraw from the labour market.
The  compensated  parental  leave  device  (Complément  de  libre  choix  d’activité)  is 
completely egalitarian on the paper since fathers as mothers can benefit from it. It is bound to 
parents of at least two children (of whom one is less than three years old) who wish to reduce 
or interrupt their activity for a period running from six months to three years. The benefit 
amounts 520-750 euros per month at the most, according to the modalities adopted.
However, in practice, it rather favours an alternation strategy of mothers participation 
in the labour market. On the one hand, this device incites mothers, who do not necessarily 
wish to, to leave at least temporarily the labour market, and on the other hand, there is no 
disposal to encourage fathers to take the leave. Practically, without explicit incentives, fathers 
are not as implicated as mothers in family life. In 2005, 97% of beneficiaries were women. As 
a matter of fact, with its current device, the parental leave is all but inciting for men. Since the 
benefit is low and independent of the previous wage7, as men earn generally more than their 
spouses, it is financially optimal for most couples that the beneficiary be the mother8. This 
reinforces inequalities within the couple: once again, women are the ones who invest more in 
family life to the prejudice of their professional life. In this respect, foreign examples show 
7 In opposition to Sweden for example, parental leave benefits take no account of parents wages on the labour 
market: a monthly lump sum is paid to beneficiaries. Until the end of 2007, the total benefit amounts 530.72 
euros for the full time benefit.
8 According to Boyer (2004), among households in which the father is the beneficiary of the parental leave 
benefit, in 60% of cases, spouses have a higher professional income, and this counted in their decision.
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how incentives can instigate a new dynamic and accelerate the setting up of a fair division of 
family responsibilities between the mother and the father. Various measures seem to boost 
fathers’ participation: assigning a fraction of the leave to fathers, replacing the lump sum with 
a benefit representing a high proportion of the wage. According to European data9, fathers 
participate more to the parental leave in countries where the benefit is high, and when a period 
of  the leave is  assigned to  them and non transferable to the mother.  In 2003,  Island has 
introduced  a  modern  policy  to  encourage  a  more  equitable  share  of  work  and  family 
responsibilities between spouses. A third of the Islanders’ parental leave is assigned to the 
mother, a third to the father, and a third can be shared between them. Periods that are not used 
by the assignee are lost. This policy may favour fertility but without putting all its weight on 
mothers. The first evaluations show that this device works since fathers take a third of the 
leave, which is the whole period they were assigned. Of course, the aim of such a measure is 
not to directly lead to total gender equality but to initiate a change. A part of the parental leave 
is also assigned to fathers in Norway, Denmark and Sweden. Another way to incite fathers to 
take the leave is to lengthen the leave if the father uses part of it (Italy). 
Moreover, the parental leave is very long which may make the reintegration on the 
labour market harder. In the current context (Complément de libre choix d’activité), the device 
has partly been improved as since July the 1st of 2006, parents of three children at least can 
choose a parental leave restricted to one year at the most, with a higher benefit (750 euros). 
This flexibility given only to parents of at least three children has not yet been evaluated but is 
interesting because it provides a possibility for parents to take care of their small children 
without staying to long out of the labour market.  But why should it  be proposed only to 
parents with at least three children, who may already be quite far from the labour market. In 
some countries,  the  parental  leave  can  be  taken  over  a  shorter  time  period  but  is  better 
compensated. For example, the Swedish parental leave gives right to 480 days of benefits that 
amount 80% of the wage (in the limit of the social security ceiling) during the 390 first days 
and a lump sum of about 10 euros per day during the 90 remaining days. A more flexible 
parental leave could also be considered in order to give the opportunity to parents to take care 
of their children when they need to. For example, Austrian, Danish and Swedish workers can 
either take the parental leave in one go or intermittently during the first years of the child. In 
Sweden, parents can work part time and receive a benefit in proportion of time they do not 
work. If by the 18 month of the child, all the benefit rights have not been used, parents have 
9 EIROnline, 1997, n°9712201.
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additional absence rights until the eighth birthday of the child. In the same way, since January 
2000, Germans can turn to part time twice.
In this context where women are the main users of a device that estrange temporarily 
the  beneficiary  from the  labour  market,  the  parental  leave  does  not  seem to  really  help 
mothers to reconcile professional and family life. On the one hand, it is inequitable between 
men and women, all the more that 40% of full rate beneficiaries of the Complément de libre  
choix d’activité declare that they would have liked to keep on working (Berger and al., 2006). 
On the other hand, the 1994 extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation to parents of 
two children10 as well as the introduction of the Complément de libre choix d’activité (and so 
a parental leave benefit for the first child) moves France away from the conciliation model 
and brings it closer to a model of alternation. The latest cannot be considered as conciliation 
since it  would imply that mothers can simultaneously keep on working and assume their 
family responsibilities. 
The second axis of French family policy regards child care through the development 
of child care services, child care benefits and the creation of a professional status for Nursery 
assistants. With child care public centres and Nursery assistants for children under three, and 
infant schools for children aged three to six, France is relatively well equipped in terms of 
supply for child care. However, the assumption of young children could be improved.
Child care benefits are essential since the relative cost of child care compared to the 
potential wage of mothers can influence their labour decision. The lower is this cost; the more 
women are  incited to  work,  whatever  their  level  of  schooling is.  With the setting of  the 
Prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant on January the 1st of 2004, the  Complément de libre 
choix du mode de garde substitutes for all anterior benefits. It is served to parents with a child 
aged six or less who continue working, whatever type of child care they choose. The objective 
is to improve the access of families to the different types of child care, and particularly to 
individual child care, of which low and medium income families were actually excluded11. In 
order to prevent some parents from choosing inactivity because of the cost of child care, the 
law of March the 23rd 2006 has prioritised the access to child care public centres to welfare 
beneficiaries who take a job. Child care benefits are rather high in France. Still, the question 
10 The consequences of the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation to parents of two children in terms 
of mothers’ labour supply have been studied for example by Piketty (2005) and Pailhé and Solaz (2006).
11 The Prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant has highly increased the benefits served to parents who have recourse 
to a Nursery assistant and has led to a convergence of family participation towards an effort rate of about 12% of 
their  income,  which  corresponds  to  the  participation  of  parents  in  child  care  public  centres.  This  means 
concretely that, compared to the previous system, an additional aid of 150 euros per month (which represents an 
increase of 75%) is offered to parents whose income is less than three times the minimum wage.
11
of their rise can be asked. In this perspective, it could be relevant to evaluate precisely the cost 
that would represent the creation of a free child care right for every child under three, as in 
some countries of Northern Europe, and the consequences of such a right on mothers’ work. It 
would also be interesting to estimate the impact of the creation of the Chèque emploi service 
universel in 2006 on the type of child care chosen by parents and on mothers’ labour supply.
Apart  from financial  benefits,  the evolution towards a  registration of the status of 
Nursery assistants (government bill of 2007) may encourage mothers’ work: on the one hand, 
it  reassures  active  mothers  who  wish  that  a  Nursery  assistant  takes  care  of  their  young 
children, and on the other hand, it gives a job opportunity to inactive women.
At last,  the increase of  child  care  supply is  a  necessary  condition  to  improve  the 
conciliation between work and family life. With the schooling of the majority of children 
from the age of three, France is doing far better than most European countries. Yet, child care 
services for children under three remain insufficient: hardly one third of children under three 
have access to child care. Since the creation of the  Aide à la famille pour l’emploi d’une 
assistante maternelle agréée (AFEAMA), and the law of July 1992 that frames the Nursery 
assistant  certificate12,  the number  of  certificated Nursery assistants  has significantly risen: 
from 166 700 in 1995, it reached 258 400 in 2001 (Barrère-Maurisson and Lemière, 2006). 
Despite these progresses, child care supply remains short and unequally distributed on the 
territory. Thus, for 100 children under three, the number of spaces in child care public centres 
varies from 3 to 39 depending on the department, the national average being 14 (Chastenet, 
2005). This is the reason why the CNAF’s aid to create new spaces is henceforth assigned in 
priority  to  projects  set  in  worst-off  departments.  Still,  the  supply  of  child  care  must  be 
increased: in France in 2003, only 29% of children under three had access to a child care 
public centre or a Nursery assistant. As a comparison, according to the report of the working 
group on “families and firms”, in Sweden in 1999, 75% of children aged 1 to 5 were received 
in either public centres or by Nursery assistants.
Mothers’ work is not an end in itself; it is an objective only because a large number of 
mothers leave the labour market though they wish to carry on working. For the time being, 
there still exists a lack of balance between measures making temporary withdrawals possible 
and those that really facilitate the conciliation between professional and family life (as the 
development of child care services for example).
12 The certificate is delivered for five years and Nursery assistants can take care of three children at the most.
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It is indeed important to help parents who want to suspend temporarily their working 
life, but it is also necessary to support mothers who want to continue working. It is no longer 
possible to support  fertility at  the expense of women’s work,  nor is it  possible to favour 
women’s work and neglect fertility. This is the reason why conciliation policies are a major 
issue of family policy. Given the overrepresentation of women among the beneficiaries of the 
compensated parental leave (97% in 2005) and the fact that among full rate beneficiaries, 40% 
would have preferred to keep on working, and the fact that nothing is done to incite fathers to 
participate  more  in  the  leave;  the  French parental  leave  policy  could  be  interpreted  as  a 
“housewife” policy, relying on a strict gender division of roles: while fathers work, mothers 
take care of the children (Martin, 1998).
In order to give the possibility to parents to make a “free choice” between working and 
leaving the labour market to raise children, the State must give the indispensable tools of this 
freedom by suppressing definitely the unbalance, which exists since the end of World War 
Two  in  France,  between  benefits  for  parents  who  stay  at  home  and  benefits  giving  the 
opportunity to both parents to continue working.
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II. Related literature
The results of studies using the sex of eldest siblings as an instrument to measure the 
effect of a third child on mothers’ labour supply differ in time and space: having a third child 
does not always reduce significantly the mother’s participation in the labour market. These 
differences  could  come  from  cultural  or  institutional  differences.  In  the  second  case, 
differences in family policies may partly explain these differences in the effect of having 
more than two children on mothers’ labour supply. 
The impact of family policies on fertility and mothers’ labour supply can be evaluated 
in two different ways. First, the effect of a family policy on fertility and/or mothers’ activity 
can be measured directly. In this case, the objective is to know whether a specific policy has 
an effect on fertility on the one hand, and if it had an effect in terms of mothers’ activity on 
the other hand. The economic literature particularly focused on the impact of parental leaves13 
and child care costs14. On French data, Piketty (2005) and De Curraize (2005) respectively 
studied the effects of the compensated parental leave and of the supply of spaces in infant 
schools. In another perspective, it could also be relevant to interrogate explicitly the effect of 
family policy in terms of conciliation between work and family life. In this case, the objective 
is to identify how a family policy measure modifies the effect of fertility on mothers’ activity. 
This  idea  is  supported  by  Bernhardt  (1993)  according  to  whom the  negative  correlation 
between fertility and mothers’ labour force participation does not come from a direct effect of 
childbearing, but rather from the process of caring for and raising children. It then becomes 
intuitive  that  if  family  policies  help  parents  to  combine  professional  and  family 
responsibilities, the negative impact of fertility on mothers’ labour supply could be reduced. 
This is what we propose to study in the fourth and fifth sections of this paper. We want to 
13 The effect of parental leave policies substantially depends on the characteristics of the leave. Ronsen and 
Sundström (1999) study the parental leave device of three Nordic countries between 1972 and 1992. They find 
that  the  generous  Swedish  parental  leave  (one  year  in  average  over  the  period)  favours  conciliation  and 
encourages  mothers  to  stay in  the  labour market  during childbearing years.  With a  shorter  entitlement,  the 
Norwegian parental leave (22 weeks at the most during the period) incites some mothers to re-enter the labour 
market more rapidly, but most of them hardly combine work and family life and end up outside the labour force. 
The long Finnish parental leave (44 weeks at the end of the period) that has to be used in one go and offers no 
part-time possibility seems to have negative consequences for women’s participation in the labour market. On 
French data, Choné, Le Blanc et Robert-Bobée (2004) estimate that the suppression of the Allocation parentale 
d’éducation would increase female’s employment rate by 4 percent points.
14 Blau  and  Robins  (1989)  show that  higher  child  care  costs  are  associated  with  lower  fertility  and  lower 
mothers’ labour supply in 1980 in the United States. Other studies on American data confirm the negative impact 
of child care costs on mothers’ labour supply (Connelly, 1992, Ribar, 1992). But, on French data, Choné, Le 
Blanc et Robert-Bobée (2004) find that child care costs has a little influence on women’s participation decisions. 
Laroque and Salanié (2005) estimated on French data that a monthly childcare credit of 180 euros per child 
under three would increase fertility by 13.4%. On Norwegian data, Kravdal (1996) suggests that an increase in 
the supply of day care has a little effect on fertility, if benefits and quality remain unchanged.
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answer the following question: to what extent do family policies alter the effect of having a 
third child on mothers’ activity, in other words to what extent do family policies have an 
effect on the conciliation between professional and family life? 
Some papers tried to  assess if  when, at  the country level,  the correlation between 
fertility  and  mothers’  activity  becomes  less  negative,  or  even  positive15,  this  could  be 
attributed  to  the  success  of  specific  family  policies  in  terms  of  conciliation  between 
professional  and  family  life.  Brewster  and  Rindfuss  (2000)  synthesise  European  and 
American researches on the link between fertility and women’s work, and on the impact that 
various policies may have on this relationship.  They try to understand the reversal  of the 
correlation between fertility and mothers’ labour supply at the country level: fertility rates 
tend to be higher in the countries where the participation rate of women in the labour market 
is also high. Their study shows that whereas, between 1970 and 1996, women’s participation 
rates increased similarly in magnitude in European Northern countries and the United States 
on  the  one  hand and in  Mediterranean  countries  on  the  other  hand,  fertility  rates  barely 
changed in the first group whereas it fell substantially in the second. According to the authors, 
these evolutions suggest that in some countries, women succeeded in combining family and 
professional  responsibilities,  and  in  others  they  have  not.  The  same  kind  of  argument  is 
provided in Brewster and Rindfuss (1996): « the negative association between fertility and 
labour  force  participation  can  be  expected to  diminish  as  the  conflict  between work  and 
family responsibilities is reduced- whether by a change in the nature of work life, shifts in the 
social organization of childcare, or a combination of the two”, which comforts our idea that 
family policies may alter the effect of fertility on mothers’ labour supply. However, Brewster 
and Rindfuss (2000) put forward the difficulty to analyse the impact of family policies on the 
relationship between fertility and mothers’ labour supply with cross-country analysis, because 
of the complexity to synthesise complex family policies that differ across a wide range of 
dimensions.
Thévenon (2007) studies for the OECD’s countries the link of different family policies 
with the performances of different countries in terms notably of fertility and women’s work. 
He finds that a high participation rate of women’s in the labour market is not contradictory 
with a high fertility, but that it depends on family policies. His results suggest that in step with 
15 The development in the 1990’s of a positive correlation between fertility and mothers’ labour supply at the 
national  level  has been suggested by several  authors among who Bernhardt  (1993),  Rindfuss  and Brewster 
(1996).
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implemented family policies, the link between fertility and mothers’ activity varies. However, 
he does not demonstrate that a causal relationship exists between these two elements. 
The  paper  of  Del  Boca  et  al.  (2007)  explicitly  puts  forward  the  importance  of 
analysing women’s participation in the labour market and fertility to determine how public 
policies  aiming at  reconciling work and family life  influence simultaneously fertility  and 
working decisions of mothers. From a study on the 15 European countries, the authors show 
that the best combination of family policies to stimulate fertility and mothers’ labour supply is 
to offer parents part time possibilities, child care services and short parental leaves. According 
to the authors, this combination gives the possibility to mothers to keep on working while 
taking care of their children. In opposition, proposing full rate long parental leaves to parents 
(until children are three years old) has important costs in terms of careers and human capital 
loss for mothers. 
Whereas these studies use comparative analysis between countries to evaluate how 
family policies may alter the link between fertility and mothers’ work, we focus on France 
and use quasi-natural experiments. More precisely, we compare groups that are not subjected 
to the same policies and compare between them the effect of fertility on mothers’ labour 
supply. The advantage of this approach is that it annihilates cultural differences and makes it 
possible  to  investigate  the  causal  impact  of  family  policies  on  the  effect  of  fertility  on 
mothers’ labour supply.
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III. Data description
The data used in this paper come from the 13 French Labour Force Surveys (LFS) 
conducted each year between 1990 and 2002 by the French Statistical Office (INSEE). 
The  sample  of  the  LFS  is  representative  of  French  metropolitan  population  aged 
fifteen and more (N=150 000, sampling rate=1/300). For each respondent, we know his birth 
date, hiss sex, his family situation, his diploma and his participation in the labour market. We 
also have for each household, the number, the sex and the birth date of each child living in the 
housing. We focus on women aged 21 to 35 having at least two children at the time of the 
survey (N = 69 386).
As Angrist and Evans (1998), we have information only on children who still live with 
their  parents.  Keeping  only  women  who  are  less  than  36  years  old  prevents  us  from 
underestimating the total  number  of  children and from introducing  errors  on  the  rank of 
siblings. Women who are more than 35 years old potentially have of age children, who have a 
higher probability to leave outside the parental home. The sample of women aged 21 to 35 
having at least two children may appear as a group in which women have children particularly 
soon. However, our calculations on the LFS show that nearly half women aged 28 to 35 have 
at least two children, and that this proportion does not increase much when considering older 
women16.
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics. Among all women having two children, 32% 
had a third child.  In this sample,  a little more than 50% of families had same sex eldest 
siblings and a little more than 51% of first births were boys, which is consistent with national 
statistics.
We present in the second part of table 1 descriptive statistics of demographic variables 
and labour supply. The labour supply variables we’re interested in are whether the woman 
works, whether she works part time, the average number of hours she works per week, her 
annual wage.
16 Among women aged 28 to 35 years old, 48.8% have at least two children, and among women aged 36 to 50 
years old, they are 54,6%.
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IV. The paid parental leave
A. Related literature
Piketty (2005) uses the LFS (1982-2002) and the Family survey (1999) to measure the 
impact of the  Allocation parentale d’éducation on women’s labour supply and fertility. He 
uses the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation to the second child in July 1994 as 
a  natural  experiment.  This extension,  which occured in one go,  constitutes an exogenous 
shock that permits to capture the effects of this policy on fertility and women’s participation 
in the labour market. This extension has in fact totally modified financial incentives of two 
children mothers (of whom one is less than three years old): if the second child is born before 
July 1994, his mother has no benefit, whereas if he is born after, she receives a benefit of 
about  450 euros  per  month  (if  she  stops  working).  Therefore,  this  reform may have  had 
considerable effects, all the more since the participation rate of mothers with two children to 
the benefit became rapidly extremely important: Piketty (2005) calculates that by the end of 
1997, more than 40% of mothers with two children (of whom one is less than three years old) 
receive actually the Allocation parentale d’éducation, and more than 30% receive a full rate 
benefit.
In terms of fertility, the effect of the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation 
are hardly measurable and rather moderate:  according to Piketty (2005), the reform could 
explain at the most 20-30% of the total increase of French fertility observed between 1994 
and 200117. On the contrary, the effect on women’s work is significant:
- On the one hand, the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation has induced in 
three years an important decline in the labour supply of mothers with two children (of 
whom one is less than three years old): out of 220 000 full rate beneficiaries of the 
Allocation parentale d’éducation for the second child, between 50% and 70% would 
not have interrupted their activity at the second birth if they had not benefited from the 
reform. This additional withdrawal movement was particularly concentrated on low 
skilled jobs.
- On the other hand, mothers of three children (of whom one is less than three years old) 
who benefited of the Allocation parentale d’éducation for the second child withdraw 
17 Using French Labour Force Surveys of 1997, 1998 and 1999, Laroque and Salanié (2005) provide maximum 
likelihood estimators  based on a discrete  choice model.  They estimate that  the extension of  the  Allocation 
parentale d’éducation caused a substantial reduction in the labour supply of eligible women, and that this reform 
explains nearly half of the increase in the number of births observed in the second half of the 1990s.
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more willingly from the labour market for their third child than others, this excess of 
interruption being close to 50 000 since 1997.
Piketty’s (2005) results clearly indicate that the French compensated parental leave 
has a negative effect on mothers’ labour supply. Moreover, having a third child reduces the 
probability of mothers’ activity and this particularly for the low qualified who also happen to 
be the main beneficiaries of the  Allocation parentale d’éducation  (Moschion, 2007). Could 
this negative causal effect of the third child on mothers’ labour supply be due to the fact that 
since its creation, mothers of three children at least were eligible to the benefit and that until 
July 1994, they were the only ones to be? The purpose of this section is to interrogate the 
reasons of the negative effect of the third child on mothers’ labour supply: is it due to an 
intrinsic effect of the third child or is it due to the incentives of the  Allocation parentale  
d’éducation? In other words, we wonder if the Allocation parentale d’éducation modifies the 
trade-off  between  fertility  and  mothers’  labour  supply  and  thus  has  an  effect  on  the 
conciliation between work and family life.  Has the extension of the  Allocation parentale  
d’éducation to parents of two children modified the terms of this trade-off for mothers of two 
children? While reducing the treatment differences between families with two children and 
more than two children18, has the extension provoked an increase in the negative effect of the 
second  child  compared  with  the  first,  and  reduced  the  negative  effect  of  the  third  child 
compared to the second?
The evolution of the Allocation parentale d’éducation provides us with the means to 
answer this question. It was created in 1985 and until July 1994, it was intended for parents 
with at least three children only. We propose to evaluate the consequences of the Allocation 
parentale d’éducation in terms of conciliation, and study if the negative effect that sustained 
the mothers of three children on their working decisions was transferred to mothers of two 
children at the moment when the  Allocation parentale d’éducation  was extended to them. 
Using the ‘same sex’ instrument that permits to evaluate the effect of having more than two 
children on mothers’ labour supply, we want to see if before the extension of the Allocation 
parentale d’éducation,  passing from two to more than two children favoured a temporary 
interruption or a reduction of work; and if after the extension, passing from two to more than 
18 This is the type of exercise conducted by Martin (1998). She opposes the period before 1962 when family 
policies where particularly generous towards families having two children and the period after 1962 when they 
were less. She shows that this evolution of family policies was accompanied with an evolution in women’s 
activity rate: the activity rate of women having two children came closer to that of women having one child 
whereas it  moved away from that  of women having three children.  However,  without using instruments to 
compute unbiased estimates of the effect of fertility on mothers’ labour supply, she cannot conclude for certain 
that family policies explain these evolutions.
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two children do not modify behaviours anymore, in other words if the fact of having more 
than  two  children  do  not  cause  additional  labour  supply  reductions.  Thus,  it  would  not 
intrinsically be the fact of having a third child that incites mothers to reduce their labour 
supply, but an influence of the compensated parental leave. The advantage of using a fertility 
shock is that it permits to evaluate the consequences of this policy apart from the changes it 
may have caused in terms of preferences in the number of children.
B. Data and descriptive statistics
In order to analyse the effect of the Allocation parentale d’éducation, we focus on a 
sub sample of the sample presented earlier. In this section, we restrict the sample to women 
that have a spouse who were a priori the only ones concerned by the reform (mothers were 
alone to who raise a young child benefited from a higher benefit since 1976). Moreover, in 
order to concentrate on the effects of the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation, 
we restrict the period to the 1990-1998 LFS so that we do not interpret the effects of other 
incentive changes as consequences of the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation19. 
The benefit being intended only for mothers having at least one child of rank two or more, 
who is less than three years old, we keep only mothers having two children whose second 
child is less than three and mothers having three children or more whose third child is less 
than three20. 
19 Piketty (2005) stops in 1997, but to compare the effect of having more than two children according to the fact 
that mothers had their second child before or after July 1994, we also keep 1998 so that mothers having had their 
second child after the reform had time to have a third child. 
20 Therefore the sample selection is not made on the number of children which would bias our sample, but on the 
age of children : we prefer to select mothers having at least three children according to the age of the third child 
rather than the age of the last child, because if  the third and the last child have a large age difference, the 
mother’s labour supply at the time when the last child is less than three gives us no information on the impact 
that had the switch over to more than two children on her labour supply. In other words, we are interested in 
mothers’ labour supply at the time they switch over from two to more than two children (thus when the third 
child is less than three). 
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We first study the annual evolution of activity rates21 and average hours worked per 
week by active mothers according to the number of children (Graph 1). The activity rate of 
mothers having one child and that of mothers having three children or more (of whom one is 
less than three) evolve in the same way between 1990 and 1998. We particularly notice that 
they do not decrease in 1994-1995. On the opposite, the activity rate of mothers having two 
children (whose youngest child is less than three) falls between 1994 and 1998 by more than 
17 points (whereas it was increasing between 1990 and 1994). We find here the same effects 
as Piketty (2005): only mothers concerned by the reform experience a fall in their activity 
rates, and this exactly at the time the reform was implemented. As a consequence, the activity 
rate of mothers having two children comes closer to that of mothers having three children or 
more (the difference between activity rates decreases from 37 to 20 points in the period), 
whereas it moves away from that of mothers having one child (the difference between activity 
rates increases from 13 to 30 points in the period). The evolution of working hours is not so 
clear. We still  observe the same type of evolution: whereas the average number of hours 
worked by mothers having two children comes closer to that of mothers having three children 
or more (the difference decreases from 7 to 4.5 hours in average), it moves away from that of 
mothers  having  one  child  (the  difference  increases  from  -0.5  to  2  hours  in  average). 
Moreover, during the critical period 1993-1995, whereas hours worked by mothers of one and 
three children increased slightly, hours worked by mothers of two children decreased. These 
descriptive statistics are consistent with the idea that the negative effect of having more than 
two children on mothers’ labour supply could to a certain extent come from the  Allocation 
parentale d’éducation.
C. Model
21 Piketty (2005) uses employment rates. We prefer to use here activity rates, i.e. we integrate unemployed, for 
two reasons. Firstly, we study how the reform modified the effect of having more than two children on working 
decisions. Yet, an unemployed woman has a priori decided to work, which is not the case of an inactive woman. 
Even though the limit between the two situations is rather vague and that some inactive women should actually 
be part of the actives, it seems more relevant to us to consider activity rates rather than employment rates which 
would be equivalent to considering the actual employment situation of mothers and not the decision they took. 
Secondly, our activity variable generates two sub samples: the first is constituted of mothers who chose to work 
and thus not to benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation, whereas the second is constituted of inactive 
mothers who are likely to receive the benefit. As unemployment benefits are not compatible with the parental 
leave benefit, unemployed that have not renounced to unemployment benefits cannot be beneficiaries of the 
parental leave benefit and thus be part of the second sub sample.
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The model used in this paper is inspired from Angrist and Evans (1998)22.  Let  js  
denote the sex of child of rank j. It is equal to one if the child is a boy, zero if it is a girl. The 
‘same sex’ instrument can then be written:
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In order to take into account the month and the year of birth of the second child, we 
created an interaction variable between ‘same sex’ and a dummy (‘ape2’) that indicates if the 
second child is born before July 1994 or not23. While in our sample all mothers with at least 
three children can have benefited from the  Allocation parentale d’éducation  for their third 
child, mothers from the first sub sample (whose second child is born before July 1994) cannot 
have benefited  from the  Allocation  parentale  d’éducation for  their  second child  whereas 
mothers from the second sub sample (whose second child is born after July 1994) can have. 
The dummy variable indicating whether the second child is born before or after July 1994 is 
also included alone in the regressions. The coefficient associated with this variable gives the 
effect of the reform on the probability that mothers of two children (with one less than three) 
are active. 
Labour supply variables  yi are linked to the endogenous explanatory variable  ‘more 
than two children’ xi, to the variable ‘ape2’, to the sex of the two eldest children and to other 
covariates24 wi by the following equation:
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The interaction coefficient between  ‘more than two children’ and  ‘ape2’ (which is 
equal to one if the mother had had a third child and that the second is born after July 1994) 
gives the effect of switching from two to more than two children on labour supply of mothers 
who could  benefit  from the  Allocation  parentale  d’éducation for  their  second child.  We 
compare this coefficient with the interaction coefficient between ‘more than two children’ and 
‘non ape2’ (which is equal to one if the mother had had a third child and that the second is 
22 According to Heckman and Macurdy (1985), the use of a two-stage linear probability model is justified when 
one considers simultaneous equations where the instrument, the endogenous variable and the dependant variable 
are dummies. Angrist and Evans (1998) as well as Conley (2004) use a model of this type to estimate the impact  
of fertility on women’s labour supply.
23 For mothers having three children or more, we want to keep only the ones whose third child is born after the 
1st of January 1985, date of creation of the  Allocation parentale d’éducation. Indeed, the objective being to 
compare mothers who could, if they had a third child, only benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation for 
their  third  child  (their  second  child  is  born  before  July  1994)  with  the  ones  who  could  benefit  from the 
Allocation parentale d’éducation for their second child (their second child is born after July 1994), we must 
restrict the sample to women who could benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation for their third child. 
As we keep mothers surveyed from 1990 whose second or third child is less than three, this one cannot be born 
before 1987. 
24 The other covariates are age, age at first and second births, nationality, cohort and diploma. 
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born  before  July  1994)  which  gives  the  effect  of  switching  from two  to  more  than  two 
children on labour supply of mothers who could not benefit from the  Allocation parentale  
d’éducation for their second child.
The first-stage regression connecting  ‘more than two children’  to the instrument  msi 
and to the ‘ape2’ variable is:
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D. Results
We report in Table 3 the ordinary least squares and two-stage least square estimates of 
the effect of ‘more than two children’ on mothers’ labour supply conditionally on the fact that 
they had or not their second child before July 1994.
Mothers whose second child is born before July 1994 represent 77% of our sample. 
The first column gives the proportion of working mothers in each sub sample and the average 
number of hours worked per week among working women. We notice that the proportion of 
active mothers is  more important among mothers who had their  second child before July 
1994; and that when they work, they work in average a higher number of hours par week. 
These results are consistent with Piketty (2005).
First-stage estimates as well as a Fisher’s test indicate that the effect of ‘same sex’ on 
the probability of having more than two children is not different according to the second 
child’s date of birth: the reform has not modified the exogenous fertility shock. However, the 
effect of  ‘same sex’  on labour supply differs according to the second child’s date of birth. 
Thus, if the second child is born before July 1994, having  ‘same sex’ eldest children has a 
negative impact on mothers’ working probability whereas if the second child is born after, 
having ‘same sex’ eldest children has no impact on mothers’ working probability. However, 
the effect of  ‘same sex’  on hours worked does not differ significantly according to the fact 
that the second child is born before or after July 1994, but the estimates are imprecise. The 
instrumental  variable estimates confirm these effects. Mothers who had their second child 
after the extension of the benefit do not suffer anymore from a negative effect on their labour 
supply when switching from two to more than two children. In other words, when a mother 
had  a  second  child  after  July  1994,  that  is  when  she  could  benefit  from the  Allocation 
parentale d’éducation for her second child, the birth of a third child did not cause additional 
withdrawal from the labour market. Thus, before 1994, mothers withdrew from the labour 
market after having a third child, whereas after 1994, they withdraw after the second child. 
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Consequently,  the withdrawal decisions of mothers with at  least  two children seem to be 
mainly linked to  the financial  incentives  of  the  Allocation parentale  d’éducation.  This  is 
consistent  with  Piketty’s  (2005)  result  indicating  that  among  the  220 000  mothers  who 
benefited from the full rate benefit for their second child at the end of 1997, at least 35% (and 
probably  more  than  50%)  would  not  have  stopped  working  without  this  new  financial 
incentive.
Nevertheless, other explanations may account for these results. On the one hand, the 
drop in activity rates of mothers’ with two children from 1994 could result from a specific 
modification in their socio-economic characteristics. For example, if their average education 
level had decreased in this period relatively to that of other mothers; or, if mothers with two 
children had always been less graduated than others, but that the effect of the diploma on the 
activity probability had increased in the period. Piketty (2005) shows that this is not the case. 
We also have included these individual characteristics in our regressions, and the effect of 
switching to more than two children on mothers’ labour supply differs before and after the 
reform. 
On the other hand, as we work with an instrumental variable, in order to attribute the 
decrease in the effect of having more than two children on mothers’ labour supply to the 
reform,  we  have  to  make  sure  that  the  reform  has  not  modified  the  preferences  and 
characteristics of mothers who are concerned with the fertility shock. In fact, if the reform had 
altered the effect of having same sex eldest siblings on the probability of having a third child 
(preference modification), this change could be the cause of the decrease in labour market 
withdrawals following the birth of a third child. In what sense could the reform had change 
parents preferences as for the sex mix of their siblings? Intuitively the story could be that 
before July 1994, only mothers with three children or more can benefit from the Allocation 
parentale d’éducation. It is then possible that mothers who wish to benefit from it are incited 
to have a third child. In this case, the financial incentive would have created opportunistic 
behaviours consisting in having a third child. This behaviour should then be logically less 
dependant on the sex of the two eldest siblings before than after the reform, when there is no 
more financial  incentive to have a third child. But, according to Table 3,  we observe the 
opposite evolution: the effect of  ‘same sex’  on the probability to have a third child is non 
significantly  higher  before  1994  than  after.  Moreover,  in  1994  the  financial  incentive 
disappear  as  mothers  with  two  children  can  also  benefit  from  the  Allocation  parentale  
d’éducation.  We should then observe a  decline  in  fertility  rates of  rank three  from 1995 
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among two children mothers (whose youngest child is less than three). According to Graph 2, 
this is not the case: we observe a quite important decrease in 1994 but that was initiated since 
1993 and that reverses in 1995 and that can consequently not be attributed to the extension of 
the Allocation parentale d’éducation. So it seems that the reform has not modified parents’ 
preferences. Besides, we checked that there are no differences in demographic characteristics 
between mothers having same sex siblings and those having different sex siblings, before and 
after the reform. The results in Table 4 show that even though mothers’ characteristics have 
evolved between the two periods, this evolution has been identical for mothers having same 
sex siblings and those having different sex siblings. The ‘same sex’ instrument can be used 
before and after the reform: its effect on the probability to have more than two children and on 
labour supply is not explained by differences in mothers’ individual characteristics.
Another way to check that the negative effect of the third child on mothers’ labour 
supply really comes from the incentives induced by the Allocation parentale d’éducation, is 
to study the evolution of this effect according to the fact that the second child is born before 
or after July 1994 on subpopulations. We know that the Allocation parentale d’éducation is 
particularly incentive for some categories of women. For example, Afsa (1998) puts forward 
the fact that the beneficiaries of the Allocation parentale d’éducation are mostly low educated 
young women. 
Consequently, we should find that if the Allocation parentale d’éducation explains the 
negative effect of the third child on mothers’ labour supply, on these subpopulations, this 
effect should be significantly negative for mothers who had their second child before 1994 
(who could not benefit  from the  Allocation parentale d’éducation for their  second child), 
whereas it should be non significant for mothers who had their second child after 1994. On 
the opposite,  for more educated and older mothers,  who benefit  less  from the  Allocation 
parentale  d’éducation,  the  effect  of  the  third  child  on  their  labour  supply  should  be 
insignificant whatever is the date of birth of their second child.
According  to  Table  5,  among  mothers  having  no  more  than  the  school-leaving 
certificate, the effect is significantly negative for the ones who could not benefit from the 
Allocation parentale d’éducation for their second child whereas it is insignificant for those 
who could benefit from it. It is particularly interesting to notice that when the second child is 
born before July 1994, the effect on low educated mothers is higher than that on the full 
sample (-0.752 against -0.509 and standard deviations are close)25. 
25 Concerning higher educated mothers, the sex of the two eldest siblings do not influence their probability of 
having more than two children. Consequently, the sex of the two eldest siblings cannot be used as an instrument 
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We find the same type of results when we split ours ample according to the age (Table 
6): for mothers aged 34 or 35, the effect of having more than two children on their labour 
supply is insignificant whatever is the birth date of their second child, whereas for mothers 
aged 21 to 33 years old,  the effect  is  significantly negative only for those who could no 
benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation for their second child26. 
Thus, switching from two to more than two children has a negative effect on mothers’ 
labour  supply  precisely  on  the  subpopulations  and  in  the  periods  when  the  Allocation 
parentale d’éducation was incentive for mothers of three children or more.
These  results  are  also  comforted  when  the  same  procedure  is  followed  with  the 
instrument ‘twins-2’ (Table 7). This time the fertility shock is produced by the birth of twins 
at the second pregnancy: ‘twins-2’ equals one if the second birth is twin, zero otherwise. The 
negative  effect  produced  by  the  birth  of  a  third  child  on  the  mother’s  labour  supply  is 
insignificant when the second child is born after the reform. Insofar as the results are similar 
with  two  instruments  that  provoke  two  different  fertility  shocks,  the  observed  evolution 
cannot be explained by the evolution of parents’ observable characteristics or preferences as a 
result of the reform27. There is no reason why after the reform, the characteristics of parents 
with same sex siblings should be modified the same way as parents who had twins. Moreover, 
even if the reform had modified parents preferences as for the sex mix of their siblings and 
that this change had reflected in the instrumental variable estimates, nothing like this can have 
happened with the ‘twins-2’ instrument, that do not result from a preference. Using ‘twins-2’ 
instrument,  the  estimates  on  the  average  number  of  hours  worked  are  more  precise  and 
indicate that a mother reduces significantly her hours worked when having a third child only 
if she could not benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation for her second child. The 
dichotomisation of the sample between high educated / low educated (Table 8) provides once 
more interesting results: it seems that higher educated mothers have also been affected by the 
reform since when their second child is born before 1994, having more than two children 
reduces their activity. But this effect is lower than that on lower educated. We also find that 
on this subpopulation. Then, we cannot use it here to show that having more than two children has no effect on 
high educated mothers’ labour supply, whatever is the birth date of their second child. 
26 Insofar as our sample of mothers is quite young, to study the effect of age, we are obliged to split our sample 
in a disproportionate way. However, mothers aged 34 and 35 years old represent nevertheless 17% of our sample 
and standard deviations  remain reasonable.  As a comparison,  mothers having more than the school-leaving 
certificate represent 20% of our sample.
27 It  is then hardly plausible that  the observed evolution of the effect  of having more than two children on 
mothers’ labour supply comes in fact from a change in the first-stage effect, namely the effect of  ‘same sex’  
(resp.  ‘twins-2’)  on the probability of having a third child.  It  then seems that  it  is  really the reform in the 
compensated parental leave that explains this change in the effect of having more than two children on mothers’ 
labour supply.
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having more than two children has a significant negative effect on hours worked only for low 
educated who had their second child before 1994. When they remained in the labour market, 
high educated mothers did not modify their hours worked whereas low educated did.
We check our results with a falsification test on men: as the conciliation burden rests 
mostly  on  women,  the  reform  of  the  Allocation  parentale  d’éducation should  not  have 
modified the behaviour of fathers. Before as after, we should not find any effect of having 
more than two children on their labour supply. This is confirmed in Table 9: whether their 
second child is born before or after the reform, the effect of having more than two children on 
mothers’ labour supply is insignificant.
All our results go the same way: with the reform, withdrawals from the labour market 
caused by a third birth disappear. We found no evidence that this could be explained other 
than by the 1994 reform.
To enlarge our result,  we also evaluated the consequences of the extension of the 
Allocation parentale  d’éducation on the behaviour  of  mothers with one and two children 
(Table  10).  As  before,  if  the  Allocation  parentale  d’éducation  is  the  cause  of  mothers’ 
withdrawal  from the  labour  market,  we should  observe no  effect  of  the  second child  on 
mothers’ labour supply if they had their second child before 1994, since at that time mothers 
with one or two children were confronted to the same incentives. On the opposite, for mothers 
who had their second child after July 1994, switching from one to two children should affect 
negatively the labour supply of two-child mothers. To identify this effect, we use a shock on 
the second birth, namely twin birth at the first pregnancy. We interact ‘twin-1’ with a dummy 
which equals one if the mother had her second child after July 1994, and zero if she could not 
benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation for her second child (that is if her second 
child is born before July 1994 or if she only has one child)28.
28 The only difference with the previous exercise is that instead of having four modalities (having two children 
and the second is born before July 1994, having two children and the second is born after July 1994, having three 
children or more and the second is born before July 1994, having three children or more and the second is born 
after July 1994), we have only three : having one child, having two children or more and the second is born 
before July 1994, having two children or more and the second is born after July 1994. As a consequence, so that 
the effect  of  the  Allocation parentale d’éducation can be identified,  we remove the principal  effect  of  the 
Allocation parentale d’éducation for the second child from the covariates (dummy which equals one if  the 
second child is born before July 1994, zero otherwise). So, every coefficient can be interpreted relatively to the 
situation where mothers had only one child: are the differences in labour supply behaviours between mothers 
with one and two children or more higher after the extension of the Allocation parentale d’éducation 
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Even if mothers whose second child is born after 1994 reduce their labour supply a bit 
more than others, the exogenous shock of 1994 has only slightly modified the effect of a 
second birth on mothers’ activity rate. On the opposite, an important difference appeared on 
hours worked according to the number of children: whereas before 1994, having two children 
or more did not influence the number of hours worked, after 1994, an active mother that had a 
second child reduced significantly her hours worked.
To sum up, the extension of the  Allocation parentale d’éducation had mainly two 
effects. Firstly, the reform introduced differences in hours worked when switching from one 
to two children or more. Secondly, switching from two to more than two children does not 
modify anymore labour supply behaviours. Consequently, it seems that because of the reform, 
whereas before 1994, mothers moved away from the labour market when they had a third 
child, since 1994, the first withdrawals occur for the second birth. Labour market withdrawals 
then seem to depend more on financial incentives than on the number of children. 
The effect of the number of children on mothers’ labour supply seems to be partly 
indirect: it comes from the financial incentives. When they are exclusively directed towards 
mothers with three children or more, they withdraw from the labour market; but when they 
are also directed towards mothers with two children, working adjustments occur from the 
second child. The effects of financial incentives are consequently extremely important: a high 
proportion of beneficiaries of the  Allocation parentale d’éducation would not have stopped 
working without  this  support.  We thus  need to  wonder  whether  the  Allocation parentale  
d’éducation gives the possibility for mothers, who wanted to, to withdraw in which case, it 
should be reformed in order for all parents have this opportunity, and especially fathers and 
highly educated mothers (for example, the amount of the benefit could depend on the initial 
wage, the leave could be shorter, and a guarantee to find one’s employment back could be 
introduced). But, insofar as 40% of beneficiaries declare that they would have preferred to 
keep on working, we must wonder whether the Allocation parentale d’éducation is not used 
more as an exit to a difficult situation on the labour market than by a choice of mothers to take 
care of their children. According to Piketty (2005), an important proportion (about one third) 
of  women  that  were  incited  to  become  inactive  because  of  the  Allocation  parentale  
d’éducation would  have  been  unemployed  in  absence  of  this  benefit.  If  the  Allocation 
parentale d’éducation  is based on the idea that each parent must have the choice between 
stopping their activity to raise his children and continue working while having satisfactory 
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child care29, it seems that the  Allocation parentale d’éducation’s device do not meet these 
requirements. It would then be appropriate to search elsewhere the solutions to solve insertion 
problems on the labour market that some women face while developing child care benefits 
that can give them the opportunity to make a free choice. In the end, the Allocation parentale  
d’éducation is not a policy of conciliation between work and family life since it increases the 
negative effect of the number of children on mothers’ labour supply. It is rather an alternation 
policy since it incites eligible mothers to withdraw temporarily from the labour market. 
29 In its report (2007) for Dominique de Villepin, Valérie Pécresse insists on the fact that the ultimate objective is 
to offer a free choice to families.
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V. The supply for child care
A. Related literature
An important number of studies emphasize that the insufficient supply for child care 
could harm the conciliation between work and family life30. Some researchers put forward the 
fact that the difficulty to find a possibility of child care for children aged less than three could 
incite mothers to reduce or cease their professional activity to take care of their child31 in 
particular in disadvantaged backgrounds. Thus, we may think that an increased development 
of child care would give the opportunity to mothers to make a free choice between working 
and taking care of their children full time.
To test the impact of the availability of child care on mothers’ labour supply, we can 
use a natural experiment, namely the heterogeneity in the geographical distribution of two-
years-old in pre-elementary public schools32. In France, all children aged three must have a 
space in a pre-elementary public school close to their residence if their parents ask for it. 
According to a survey on child care, led in 2002 by an administration (Drees), in June 2002, 
97% of children aged three by the 31st of December 2001 were in school. On the opposite, the 
schooling of two-year-olds depends on the number of spaces: the law indicates that children 
who are two by the start of the new school year can be accepted in pre-elementary public 
schools if spaces are available (Blanpain, 2006). As a result, we observe a high heterogeneity 
in the geographical distribution of two-year-olds in pre-elementary public  schools:  At the 
beginning of 2005 school year, the schooling rates of two-years-olds in pre-elementary public 
schools varied by departments from 4% to 66%. Consequently, for mothers who live in a 
department  that  provides  a  high  number  of  spaces  for  two-year-olds,  the  pre-elementary 
public school could have the effect of a free child care, by reducing the mother’s opportunity 
30 Méda (2006), report Pécresse (2007).
31 According to the Observatoire national de la petite enfance, among children living with their two parents and 
having a mother who works part time, 10% have a mother who works part time because of the lack of child care 
or because it is too expensive. 
32 The point is not to advocate the generalisation of two-years-olds schooling in pre-elementary public schools. 
Indeed, as Fabre’s (2005) report on child care in Ile-de-France recalls, the two-years-olds schooling in pre-
elementary public schools is a contentious idea: child psychiatrists and psychoanalysts give mainly a negative 
opinion on this issue whereas parents’ federations take a stand in favour of this pre-schooling but under some 
conditions.  In  any  case,  the  point  is  here,  not  to  study  the  consequences  of  pre-schooling  on  children’s 
development, but to study its consequences for mothers’ labour supply. We simply use the schooling rates of 
two-years-olds in pre-elementary public schools in order to study whether when a free child care is offered to 
parents, the consequences of fertility on mothers’ labour supply are less important. 
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cost of working and thus stimulating mothers’ labour supply33.  On the opposite, it  can be 
harder to work for mothers living in departments were the number of spaces provided is low.
Y. De Curraize (2005) tries to identify and measure the effect of pre-elementary public 
schools’ availability on the labour supply of mothers with young children. In France, almost 
all children aged three and more and one third of children aged two were in pre-elementary 
public  schools  in  1982,  whereas  in  1968,  a  minority  were.  By giving  the  opportunity  to 
mothers to withdraw less often and for a less long time from the labour market after child 
births, has the increase in pre-elementary public schools’ availability contributed to the rise in 
mothers’ employment rate?
To  study  the  effect  of  this  exogenous  institutional  change  on  mothers’  labour 
behaviour,  he  uses  the  difference-in-difference  method.  He  compares  the  labour  supply 
behaviour of mothers’ concerned with the change, with that of a control group who has not 
been confronted to the change. A limit of this study is that the access to pre-elementary public 
schools for children aged two to four was progressive: there is no date such that before no 
children go to school and after which all go. Insofar as two-year-olds schooling rate increases 
since 1977, he compares the employment rate evolution of mothers’ whose youngest child is 
two-years-old with that of mothers’ whose youngest child is less than two-years-old, opposing 
the  1969-1976  and  the  1977-1981  period.  In  the  first  time  period,  there  should  be  no 
difference in employment rate between mothers  whose youngest child is two-years-old and 
mothers’ whose youngest child is less than two-years-old.  In the second time period, there 
should be a rise in employment rate of mothers  whose youngest child is two-years-old and 
thus a difference between the two groups. Y. De Curraize finds that the effect of two-year-
olds  schooling  in  pre-elementary  public  schools  is  only  significant  at  the  10%  level34. 
According to the author, the difference observed between mothers’ employment rates during 
the first and the second time period could come from the changes in fertility behaviour that 
occurred in the seventies.
The  geographical  distribution  of  two-years-old  in  pre-elementary  public  schools 
provides him with another exogenous variation in the availability level.  According to the 
33 According to Blanpain (2006), in June 2002, 37% of children aged two by the 31st of December 2001 were 
sent to school at least the morning. For the majority of them, school follows parents’ care, which is the main 
child care for pre-school children: among two-year-olds who go to school in the morning, about 68% used to be 
with their parents at this time of the day. Even if the majority of two-year-olds who go to school go only in the 
morning, this can give the opportunity to mothers to progressively re-enter the labour market. 
34 Other  things  equal,  the  marginal  effect  of  two-year-olds’  schooling  is  reduced :  the  difference  between 
employment rate of mothers having a two-year-old child and that of those whose child is less than two is only 
2.5 higher in the period when the schooling of two-year-olds was high compared with the period when it was 
low.
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author,  these  disparities  are  not  the  consequence  of  geographical  variation  in  mothers’ 
employment rates. The positive effect of pre-elementary schooling on the labour supply of 
mothers with young children will be confirmed if the difference between the employment 
rates  of  the  treatment  and  control  group  is  higher  in  departments  where  two-year-olds’ 
schooling is high. The results indicate that the difference in employment rates according to the 
age of the child is not higher in departments where two-year-olds’ schooling is high. The 
author explains that departments where two-year-olds’ schooling is high are also more rural, 
and religion is more important. Thus, it should be checked that this un-convincing result is not 
due to the fact that despite the opportunity of sending their child to school earlier, mothers 
living in these departments do not work more than others,  but  for other reasons than the 
availability of child care. We can add that most children who go to school at age two, only go 
part time, which do not completely solve the issue of child care and could explain its limited 
impact  on mothers’  activity.  He recalls  that  his  result  does  not  imply that  two-year-olds’ 
schooling has no effect on mothers’ labour supply.
Beyond the direct  effect  that  two-year-old schooling can have on mothers’  labour 
supply,  it  can also affect  the  conciliation  between work and family  life.  Early  schooling 
possibilities may affect simultaneously fertility and working decisions, but above all they may 
alter the effect of the number of children on mothers’ labour supply. Using the  ‘same sex’ 
instrument that enables to evaluate the effect of having more than two children on mothers’ 
labour supply, we wonder if in departments where two-year-olds’ schooling is high, the effect 
of  fertility  on mothers’  labour  supply is  lower  than in  departments  where  two-year-olds’ 
schooling is low. The question we address is whether the activity rate difference between 
mothers  with  same  sex  siblings  and  mothers  with  different  sex  siblings  is  higher  in 
departments where two-year-olds’ schooling is low than in departments where two-year-olds’ 
schooling is high (that is when mothers with same sex siblings, who more often have a third 
child, are less disadvantaged).
We study in this section if the effect of having more than two children on mothers’ 
labour supply is less important in departments where two-year-olds’ schooling is high. Using 
a  fertility  shock enables  us  to  assess  the  consequences  of  a  higher  schooling  supply  for 
children aged two apart from changes it could cause in terms of preferences in the number of 
children.
B. Data and descriptive Statistics
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Firstly, we have to create two groups of department: the ones where the schooling rate 
for two-year-olds’ is high and the ones where it is low. Insofar as we pile up 13 survey years 
(1990 to 2002), there should not be too much change during the period. In other words, the 
classification of departments according to the schooling rate for two-year-olds should not be 
too different in the beginning and in the end. We use the two-year-olds’ schooling rates in 
1997 and 2003 (Graph 3)35. We classify in the group of high schooling rate for two-year-olds 
the departments that were in the first third in 1997 and in 2003 (we remove those whose 
schooling rate for two-year-olds’ collapsed between 1997 and 2003). In the same way, we 
classify in the group of low schooling rate for two-year-olds the departments that were in the 
last  third  in  1997  and  2003  (we  remove  those  whose  schooling  rate  for  two-year-olds 
collapsed or increased importantly between 1997 and 2003). The list of departments and their 
classification is provided in annex. Our two groups are consistent with other studies according 
to which the schooling rate for two-year-olds’ is traditionally high in the West, the North, the 
Centre and low in Ile-de-France, Alsace and South-East. 
We restrict the sample to women with a spouse. In addition, since the objective is to 
measure how a higher schooling supply for two-year-olds can alter the effect of having more 
than two children on mothers’ labour supply, we decided to restrict the sample to mothers 
whose second child is two-years-old (for mothers with two children) and to mothers whose 
third child is two years old (for mothers with at least three children)36.
Our sample contains 7245 observations, among which about 60% are in the group 
where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low.
C. Model
We use the same model as previously. In order to consider the living department, we 
created an interaction variable between ‘same sex’ and a dummy (‘highrate’) that indicates if 
the household lives in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high. The 
35 We have no similar data for previous years.
36 As in the previous section, the sample selection is not made on the number of children which would bias our 
sample, but on the age of children : we prefer to select mothers having at least three children according to the age 
of the third child rather than the age of the last child, because if the third and the last child have a large age 
difference, the mother’s labour supply at the time when the last child is two gives us no information on the 
impact that had the switch over to more than two children on her labour supply. In other words, we are interested 
in mothers’ labour supply at the time they switch over from two to more than two children (thus when the third 
child is two). 
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dummy variable indicating whether the household lives in a department where the schooling 
rate  for  two-year-olds  is  high  is  also  included  alone  in  the  regressions.  The  coefficient 
associated with this variable gives the difference between the activity probability of mothers 
who live in  a  department  where the schooling rate  for  two-year-olds is  high and that  of 
mothers who live in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low.
Labour supply variables  yi are linked to the endogenous explanatory variable  ‘more 
than two children’ xi, to the variable ‘high rate’, to the sex of the two eldest children and to 
other covariates37 wi by the following equation:
iiiiiiiiii lowratexhighratexhighratesswy εββαααα +∗+∗++++= 21322110'
The interaction coefficient between ‘more than two children’ and ‘highrate’ (which is 
equal  to  one  if  the  mother  had  had  a  third  child  and  resides  in  a  department  where  the 
schooling rate for two-year-olds is high) gives the effect of switching from two to more than 
two children on labour supply of mothers who live in a department where the schooling rate 
for  two-year-olds  is  high.  We  compare  this  coefficient  with  the  interaction  coefficient 
between ‘more than two children’ and ‘lowrate’ (which is equal to one if the mother had had 
a third child and resides in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low) 
which gives the effect of switching from two to more than two children on labour supply of 
mothers who reside in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low.
The first-stage regression connecting  ‘more than two children’  to the instrument  msi 
and to the ‘high rate’ variable is:
iiiiiiiiii lowratemshighratemshighratesswx ηγγpipipipi +∗+∗++++= 21322110'
D. Results
We report in Table 11 ordinary least square and two-stage least square estimates of the 
effect of ‘more than two children’ on mothers labour supply conditionally on the fact that they 
live in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high or low.
Results are not very convincing in the sense that all coefficients from instrumented 
regressions are insignificant. However, it is worth noticing that the effects go the right way: 
for mothers living in departments where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low, having 
more than two children has a non significant negative effect on their activity probability and 
hours worked, whereas these effects  are  insignificantly positive in departments where the 
37 The other covariates are age, age at first and second births, nationality, cohort and diploma. 
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schooling rate for two-year-olds is high. We then ask whether this insignificance comes from 
the imprecision of estimates (standard deviations are rather high) or from the fact that there is 
no effect.
We checked that there was no bias due to endogenous location of households, namely 
that  households’  geographical  distribution  according  to  the  sex  of  the  eldest  siblings  is 
random. In departments  where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high (resp. low), the 
observed number of households with same sex siblings is identical to the theoretical number38 
(first part of Table 12). In particular, there are no more households with same sex siblings in 
the departments where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low. If this was not the case, it 
could  be  that  the  higher  negative  correlation  between  the  sex  of  the  eldest  siblings  and 
mothers’ labour supply in departments where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low is 
fallacious. In other words, it would be possible that this higher negative correlation does not 
come from the fact that in these departments having more than two children has a bigger 
negative impact on mothers’ labour supply than in other departments, but from a coincidence 
of two phenomenon: there are more families with same sex siblings, in which mothers’ labour 
supply is lower. 
Besides, this strategy enables to solve the problem linked to the fact that departments 
with low levels of schooling for two-year-olds may be characterised by other elements which 
affects mothers’ labour supply. Indeed, suppose that in departments where the schooling rate 
for two-year-olds is low, mothers’ activity rate has always been lower and fertility rate higher 
for religious or cultural reasons. These reasons may explain that the schooling rate for two-
year-olds is low. In this case, the relationship is inverted: it  is not the schooling rate that 
explains labour supply, but the low activity which caused a low schooling rate for two-year-
olds. But, insofar as households with same sex siblings are randomly distributed, having same 
sex  siblings  is  not  correlated  with  local  characteristics.  Thus,  instrumentation  enables  to 
measure other things equal the effect of having more than two children on mothers’ labour 
supply.  Moreover,  De  Curraize  (2005)  explains  that  the  hypothesis  according  to  which 
schooling rates  depend more on the  evolution of  supply,  than on the level  of  demand is 
credible since we are in a situation of shortage, of demand rationing.
We check (lower part of Table 12) that for a given group of departments (for example 
those where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high), mothers with same sex siblings are 
38 For the departments where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high (resp. low), the theoretical number of 
households with same sex siblings is equal to the product of the total number of households with same sex 
siblings in our sample by the proportion of observations that belong to the group where the schooling rate for 
two-year-olds is high (resp. low).
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not significantly different from mothers with different sex siblings. Consequently, differences 
between these two groups in terms of fertility and activity cannot be attributed to differences 
in individual characteristics of these mothers other than the sex of their eldest children.
We then try to identify if the non convincing results we found are due to the lack of 
precision of the estimates or to the fact that schooling at two-years-old has no effect on the 
link between having more than two children and women’s labour supply. We reproduce the 
same exercise we did previously on other samples on the one hand, and with the  ‘twins-2’ 
instrument on the other hand.
Table 13 gives the result for married men aged 21 to 35 having at least two children 
and  whose  second  or  third  child  is  two  years  old.  The  estimated  coefficients  with  the 
instrumental variable method are even less significant than for mothers and the sign of the 
coefficients is inverted: in departments where  the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low, 
having a  third  child has  a non significant  positive effect  on fathers’  probability to work, 
whereas it is non significantly negative in departments where the schooling rate for two-year-
olds is high. Table 14 gives the result for a larger sample of mothers: we keep mothers whose 
second or third child is aged two to ten. This extension of the sample has two advantages : it 
increases the sample and consequently the precision of the estimates, but also it makes it 
possible to study long term effects that two-years-old schooling could have. However, the 
disadvantage of this strategy is that with the LFS there is no way to know where the family 
lived at the time their second or third child was two. They may have moved between the 
moment when the schooling rate for two-year-olds was important to them and the moment 
they were surveyed. In particular, some parents could have moved from a department where 
the schooling rate for two-year-olds was low to a  department where  the schooling rate for 
two-year-olds is high or inversely. Results are nevertheless interesting: in departments where 
the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high, the effect of having more than two children on 
mothers’ labour supply switches from 0.402 to 0.100 and remains insignificant, whereas in 
departments where  the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low, it  switches from -0.736 to 
-0.662 and becomes significant. Consequently, this sample extension provokes a significant 
reduction of standard deviations and of the coefficient in  departments where  the schooling 
rate is high. These results rather seem to indicate that the insignificance of former results in 
departments where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is low is due to a lack in precision.
The use of ‘twins-2’ as instrumental variable (Table 15) tends to comfort this idea. We 
find that  in  departments where  the schooling rate  for  two-year-olds is  high,  the effect  of 
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having  more  than  two  children  on  mothers’  labour  supply  is  not  significant,  whereas  in 
departments  where  the schooling rate  for  two-year-olds  is  low,  the effect  is  significantly 
negative. However, when using twins as instrumental variable, results should be interpreted 
with caution given the specificities presented by mothers of twins. 
Table 16 gives the results  when  ‘twins-1’ is used as an instrument to measure the 
effect of having more than one child on mothers’ labour supply. It is worthwhile noticing that 
in this case, whatever the department, having a second child has a negative effect on mothers’ 
labour supply. According to these results, since we observe no difference according to the 
schooling rate for two-year-olds, it does not seem to affect the conciliation between work and 
family life for parents of two children, but it  seems to have an effect for parents of three 
children  for  whom we observe  a  different  effect  of  fertility  on  activity  according  to  the 
schooling rate for two-year-olds in the department of residence. 
Our results seem to suggest that the schooling rate for two-year-olds has a small effect 
on the opportunities for mothers to reconcile work and family life. However, studies from the 
Ministry of Education show that since pre-elementary public schools are not intended for two-
years-old  children,  it  is  maladaptive  and  cannot  constitute  a  sustainable  solution.  The 
development of more adapted and low cost child care could have a higher impact on mothers’ 
labour supply since it could incite mothers who did not want to pre-school their children to 
return on the labour market.
The weakness of our results could come from the fact that what counts is not just the 
schooling  rate  for  two-year-olds  but  the  total  supply  of  low  cost  child  care.  Yet,  the 
geographical distribution of schooling rate for two-year-olds is complementary of other low-
cost child care. According to Bailleau (2007), there is a high level of collective child care 
centres in South-East, Alsace and Ile-de-France whereas it is weak in West, North and Centre. 
It is thus exactly were  schooling rate for two-year-olds are low that the level of collective 
child care is high and vice versa. As a consequence, it could be more relevant to distinguish 
the departments according to the whole supply of low cost child care. However, the problem 
with this is that unlike the schooling rate for two-year-olds, the level of collective child care 
may be endogenous and result from the demand of mothers who wish to keep on working. 
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Conclusion
According  to  OECD,  “family  policies  are  defined  as  those  policies  that  increase 
resources of households with dependent children; foster child development; reduce barriers to 
having children and combining work and family commitments; and, promote gender equity in 
employment opportunities.” We showed in this report that some French family policies do not 
reach the goals in terms of conciliation and equity.
In particular, we showed that the compensated parental leave increases the negative 
effect  of  having  more  than  two  children  on  mothers’  labour  supply,  and  thus  does  not 
facilitate the conciliation between work and family life. It seems especially to have two major 
defects: some mothers (the highly educated for example) and fathers are in practice excluded 
from the device although they could wish to benefit from it; whereas others are financially 
incited to take it although they would have preferred to keep on working. Yet, the parental 
leave must give the opportunity to each parent to freely choose to raise its children, and thus 
reduce inequalities between men and women, and between women themselves. A shorter and 
better compensated parental leave could reduce the non-incentive character of the parental 
leave for some segments of the population. 
Moreover,  the  parental  leave  must  not  be  an  escape  hatch  for  women  facing 
difficulties to enter the labour market since it is not its role. The role of employment policies, 
which is particularly to find better solutions for these women that wish to work more, must 
not  be  confused  with  that  of  family  policies,  which  must  help  parents  improve  the 
combination of professional and private life: raising children must be an active choice and not 
a by default choice. 
Concerning child care, our work partly shows that when the schooling rate for two-
years-old is  high,  mothers’  labour  supply depends less on the number  of  children.  Thus, 
conciliation burden seem to be less heavy for mothers. These results are consistent with that 
of other studies which put forward the need to develop child care in order to improve the 
conciliation between work and family life39. In particular, the Barcelona European Council 
has set objectives for 2010 concerning the setting up of child care facilities for at least 90% 
aged three to the age of compulsory schooling, and for at least 33% of children aged less than 
three. Even if France already meets these requirements, it seems that increasing child care 
39 Pécresse (2007), Périvier and Méda (2007), Méda, Simon and Wierink (2003), Thévenon (2004).
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supply would be necessary,  in particular for children less than three, in order to give the 
possibility to  mothers to  work as much as  they want,  but  also in order  to  favour gender 
equality, and equality between women of different social groups.
We  evaluated  the  consequences  of  some  family  policies  in  terms  of  conciliation 
between work and family life for mothers with a methodology that enables to capture how a 
specific family policy alters the effect of the number of children on mothers’  activity.  A 
natural extension of this work would be to evaluate with the same methodology the recent 
modifications introduced in the compensated parental leave. 
For example, the creation in 2004 of a six month benefit for mothers of one child 
could have the same type of effect than that observed on two-children mothers after the 1994 
reform. It  would thus be interesting to study if  since 2004, the activity rate of one child 
mothers has significantly decreased. Has the negative effect of having more than one child on 
mothers’ labour supply decreased? To answer this question, we must wait at least 2008 so that 
women who received the benefit for their first child “had time” to have a second child.
Since the 1st of July 2006, the parents who have at least three children can chose a 
compensated parental leave restricted to one year but that is better compensated (750 euros). 
This flexibility would be particularly interesting to evaluate since it enables to see if such a 
device has attracted more educated women and men, but also if it gave the possibility for 
some  mothers  to  withdraw  less  durably  from  the  labour  market  and  thus  improve  the 
conciliation between work and family life.
Concerning child care, it could be interesting to evaluate how the introduction of the 
Complément de libre choix du mode de garde for children aged zero to six and born after the 
1st January 2004 has altered the effect of fertility on activity. Thus, if increasing child care 
benefits and making them more accessible, conciliation has improved for mothers.
This methodology could also give some elements of explanation on the differences 
observed  between  countries.  The  effect  of  fertility  on  mothers’  activity  differs  across 
countries.  These  differences  could  partly  come  from  differences  in  family  policies 
implemented in the different countries. By evaluating the effect of family policies in different 
countries, it may be possible to evaluate in each country how the effect of fertility on activity 
is due to family policies.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, women aged 21-35 with two or more children
Variable All women Women with spouse
2,43                   
(0,74)
2,43               
(0,74)
0,320                
(0,466)
0,321                
(0,467)
0,512                
(0,500)
0,512                
(0,500)
0,510                
(0,500)
0,510                
(0,500)
0,263                
(0,440)
0,262                
(0,440)
0,241                
(0,428)
0,240                
(0,427)
0,504                
(0,500)
0,502                
(0,500)
0,010                
(0,099)
0,010                
(0,099)
31,4                  
(3,0)
31,4                  
(3,0)
22,7                   
(3,4)
22,9                   
(3,4)
0,619              
(0,486)
0,608              
(0,488)
0,394              
(0,489)
0,399              
(0,490)
27,7                   
(16,7)
27,5                   
(16,8)
6423               
(12255)
6432               
(11968)
69386 64108Number of observations
Age
Age at 1st birth
Worked for pay (1)
Worked part time (1)
First two children are 
same sex (1)
2nd birth was a twin
Average hours worked per 
week
Labor income
Means and (standard deviations)
(1) : these are proportions.
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Sample: women aged 21-35 with at least two children.
Number of children
Women with more than 
two children (1)
Women whose 1st child 
was a boy (s1)
Women whose 2nd child 
was a boy (s2)
Women whose 1st and 
2nd child were boys
Women whose 1st and 
2nd child were girls
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Table 2: Women’s activity and fertility rate in 2004
Country Activity rate Fertility rate
Italy 50,60% 1,33
Hungary 54,00% 1,28
Greece 54,10% 1,29
Luxemburg 55,90% 1,69
Spain 57,70% 1,32
Ireland 58,00% 1,93
Poland 58,20% 1,23
Czech Republic 62,20% 1,22
Slovakia 62,90% 1,24
France 63,80% 1,91
Austria 64,20% 1,42
Germany 65,80% 1,36
Australia 66,90% 1,77
Portugal 67,00% 1,4
Netherlands 67,80% 1,73
United States 69,20% 2,06
United Kingdom 69,60% 1,63
Finland 71,90% 1,8
Switzerland 73,90% 1,42
Norway 75,70% 1,83
Denmark 76,10% 1,78
Sweden 76,60% 1,75
Island 81,80% 2,04
Source: INED (Observatoire démographique européen et Evolution 
démographique récente des pays développés, Population, 3, 2006) for 
fertility indicators (average number of children per woman) and OECD for 
activity rates of women aged 15-64.
The activity rate has been calculated dividing the concerned active 
population by the concerned total population. For example, the activity rate 
of French women aged 15-64 = number of French active women aged 15-
64  / number of French women aged 15-64.
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Graph 1
Evolution of activity rate
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Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Sample: mothers with a spouse aged 21-35 and with at least one of the three first children aged less than three.
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Table 3: Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having 
more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is 
born before/after July 1994
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,528 0,019         
(0,009)
-0,004         
(0,013)
-0,171         
(0,029)
-0,248         
(0,563)
0,564 0,027         
(0,005)
-0,014         
(0,007)
-0,334         
(0,009)
-0,509         
(0,249)
23,0 0,019         
(0,009)
-1,110         
(0,731)
-6,606         
(2,106)
-59,953         
(39,821)
26,3 0,027         
(0,005)
-0,499         
(0,390)
-11,129         
(0,598)
-19,937         
(15,569)
22780 22780 22780 22780 22780
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort and 
sex of first and second child.
Women with a spouse
B. Results for hours / week
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born    
< 1994
N
2nd child born 
< 1994
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children.
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Graph 2
Evolution of fertility rate of parity 3
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Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Sample: mothers with a spouse aged 21-35 with at least two children and whose last child is less than three.
The fertility rate of parity three gives the proportion of mothers in the sample that had a third child a given year.
Reading: in 1995, among mothers with a spouse aged 21-35 with at least two children and whose last child is less  
than three, 2.5% had a third child.
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Table 4: Differences in means for demographic variables by  ‘same sex’ for mothers that 
could benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation for their second child
Age Age at first birth
Age at 
second 
birth
French 
nationality
Age at 
the end 
of 
studies
Diploma 2nd birth after 1994
Number 
of 
children
3rd child
MS (1) 29,9938   (0,0628)
24,7560   
(0,0651)
28,4106   
(0,0625)
0,9270   
(0,0051)
19,3477   
(0,0922)
0,2413   
(0,0084)
1,0000   
(0,0000)
2,0641   
(0,0050)
0,0618   
(0,0047)
DS  
(2) 30,0842   
(0,0607)
24,7837   
(0,0638)
28,5347   
(0,0605)
0,9284   
(0,0050)
19,3592   
(0,1049)
0,2369   
(0,0083)
1,0000   
(0,0000)
2,0399   
(0,0040)
0,0385   
(0,0038)
Diff -0,0904   
(0,0872)
-0,0277   
(0,0912)
-0,1240   
(0,0869)
-0,0014   
(0,0072)
-0,0115   
(0,1397)
0,0044   
(0,0118)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
0,0241   
(0,0064)
0,0233   
(0,0061)
(1): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are same sex.
(2): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are different sex.
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children who could benefit from the Allocation parentale d'éducation for their second 
child.
Var.
Differences in means for demographic variables by ‘same sex’ for mothers that could not 
benefit from the Allocation parentale d’éducation for their second child
Age Age at first birth
Age at 
second 
birth
Age at 
the end of 
studies
Diploma
2nd birth 
after 
1994
Number 
of 
children
3rd child
MS (1) 30,2291   (0,0332)
23,4885   
(0,0346)
26,8993   
(0,0354)
0,9125   
(0,0030)
18,4271   
(0,0544)
0,1869   
(0,0041)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
2,4033   
(0,0057)
0,3806   
(0,0051)
DS  
(2) 30,1646   
(0,0338)
23,3962   
(0,0361)
26,8798   
(0,0359)
0,9174   
(0,0029)
18,4250   
(0,0555)
0,1904   
(0,0042)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
2,3705   
(0,0057)
0,3485   
(0,0051)
Diff 0,0645   
(0,0474)
0,0924   
(0,0500)
0,0195   
(0,0504)
-0,0049   
(0,0042)
0,0021   
(0,0777)
-0,0035   
(0,0059)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
0,0328   
(0,0080)
0,0320   
(0,0073)
(1): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are same sex.
(2): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are different sex.
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children who could not benefit from the Allocation parentale d'éducation for 
their second child.
French 
nationality
Var.
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Table 5: Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having 
more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is 
born before/after July 1994, sub sample of less graduated mothers
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,460 0,021         
(0,011)
-0,014         
(0,015)
-0,204         
(0,034)
-0,697         
(0,612)
0,521 0,029         
(0,006)
-0,022         
(0,008)
-0,349         
(0,011)
-0,752         
(0,274)
23,3 0,021         
(0,011)
-1,783         
(0,915)
-9,552         
(3,165)
-102,543         
(58,345)
27,2 0,029         
(0,006)
-0,325         
(0,457)
-11,483         
(0,720)
-11,670         
(16,900)
18221 18221 18221 18221 18221
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Women with a spouse
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
B. Results for hours / week
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
N
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children and with the 
school leaving certificate at the most.
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort 
and sex of first and second child.
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Table 6: Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having 
more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is 
born before/after July 1994, sub sample of older mothers
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,622 0,042         
(0,022)
0,027         
(0,033)
-0,156         
(0,068)
0,613         
(0,767)
0,612 0,022         
(0,011)
-0,001         
(0,017)
-0,351         
(0,026)
0,003         
(0,791)
23,1 0,042         
(0,022)
-0,807         
(1,638)
-14,071         
(3,788)
-35,033         
(97,079)
25,9 0,022         
(0,011)
-1,422         
(0,870)
-11,731         
(1,422)
-132,028         
(169,998)
3723 3723 3723 3723 3723
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort and 
sex of first and second child.
N
Sample: women with a spouse aged 34 to 35 with at least two children.
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
B. Results for hours / week
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
Dependant variable:
Women with a spouse
Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having more 
than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is born 
before/after July 1994, sub sample of younger mothers
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,512 0,014         
(0,011)
-0,010         
(0,014)
-0,174         
(0,032)
-0,666         
(0,748)
0,554 0,030         
(0,006)
-0,017         
(0,008)
-0,324         
(0,009)
-0,562         
(0,257)
23,0 0,014         
(0,011)
-1,094         
(0,818)
-3,004         
(2,537)
-74,679         
(59,774)
26,4 0,030         
(0,006)
-0,259         
(0,437)
-9,327         
(0,635)
-8,598         
(14,458)
19057 19057 19057 19057 19057
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort and 
sex of first and second child.
N
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 33 with at least two children.
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
B. Results for hours / week
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
Dependant variable:
Women with a spouse
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Table 7: Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having 
more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is 
born before/after July 1994
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Twins-2
0,528 1,015         
(0,042)
-0,105         
(0,061)
-0,171         
(0,029)
-0,093         
(0,061)
0,564 0,804         
(0,026)
-0,251         
(0,037)
-0,334         
(0,009)
-0,313         
(0,045)
23,0 1,015         
(0,042)
0,525         
(3,609)
-6,606         
(2,106)
0,698         
(3,633)
26,3 0,804         
(0,026)
-5,807         
(2,550)
-11,129         
(0,598)
-6,310         
(2,735)
22780 22780 22780 22780 22780
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children.
N
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort and 
sex of first and second child.
2nd child born 
< 1994
B. Results for hours / week
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born    
< 1994
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
Women with a spouse
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Table 8: Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having 
more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is 
born before/after July 1994, sub sample of more graduated mothers
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Twins-2
0,747 1,011         
(0,068)
-0,071         
(0,089)
-0,068         
(0,055)
-0,064         
(0,090)
0,745 0,818         
(0,060)
-0,194         
(0,079)
-0,277         
(0,019)
-0,238         
(0,095)
22,5 1,011         
(0,068)
3,178         
(4,818)
-5,095         
(2,875)
3,397         
(4,971)
24,0 0,818         
(0,060)
-1,680         
(4,983)
-10,140         
(1,077)
-1,853         
(5,452)
4559 4559 4559 4559 4559
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Women with a spouse
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
B. Résultats pour les heures / semaines
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
N
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children and with more 
than the school leaving certificate.
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort.
Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having more 
than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is born 
before/after July 1994, sub sample of less graduated mothers
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Twins-2
0,460 1,020         
(0,054)
-0,151         
(0,078)
-0,205         
(0,034)
-0,138         
(0,079)
0,521 0,800         
(0,029)
-0,262         
(0,042)
-0,349         
(0,011)
-0,329         
(0,052)
23,3 1,020         
(0,054)
-4,085         
(5,537)
-9,661         
(3,164)
-4,077         
(5,513)
27,2 0,800         
(0,029)
-7,176         
(2,963)
-11,479         
(0,720)
-7,745         
(3,151)
18221 18221 18221 18221 18221
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Women with a spouse
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
B. Résultats pour les heures / semaines
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
N
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children and with the 
school leaving certificate at the most.
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort.
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Table 9: Ordinary least square and Two-stage least square estimates of the effect of having 
more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child is 
born before/after July 1994, sub sample of fathers
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,988 0,011         
(0,011)
0,001         
(0,003)
-0,026         
(0,006)
0,078         
(0,147)
0,993 0,023         
(0,006)
0,003         
(0,002)
-0,001         
(0,02)
0,114         
(0,072)
39,1 0,011         
(0,011)
-0,626         
(0,525)
3,069         
(1,226)
-29,282         
(21,885)
39,2 0,023         
(0,006)
-0,316         
(0,289)
-0,831         
(0,389)
-11,583         
(10,620)
17997 17997 17997 17997 17997
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Main effect for the Allocation parentale d'éducation  is included in the equation.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Men with a spouse
Dependant variable:
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort and 
sex of first and second child.
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born    
< 1994
N
Sample: men with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children.
A. Results for work for pay
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
B. Results for hours / week
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Table  10:  Ordinary least  square  and  Two-stage  least  square  estimates  of  the  effect  of 
having more than one child on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the second child 
is born before/after July 1994
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 1 
child)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Twins-1
0,528 0,710         
(0,037)
-0,293         
(0,044)
-0,255         
(0,008)
-0,414         
(0,063)
0,699 0,541         
(0,023)
-0,204         
(0,027)
-0,202         
(0,006)
-0,380         
(0,045)
23,0 0,710         
(0,037)
-8,164         
(2,819)
-6,734         
(0,456)
-10,303        
(3,627)
27,4 0,541         
(0,023)
-2,651         
(1,643)
-4,405         
(0,339)
-4,708         
(2,578)
42217 42217 42217 42217 42217
Source: labour force surveys 1990-1998, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least one child.
B. Résultats pour les heures / semaines
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
N
2nd child born 
>= 1994
2nd child born 
< 1994
Women with a spouse
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
Other covariates are age, age at first birth, diploma, nationality, cohort.
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Graph 3: Schooling rate of two-year-olds in 2003 and 1997
Source: Ministry of Education, http://media.education.gouv.fr/file/06/7/3067.pdf 
Source: Ministry of Education, ftp://trf.education.gouv.fr/pub/edutel/dpd/geosp4.pdf 
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Annex
Departments with high schooling rates for two-years-olds:
Departments where the schooling rate was above or equal to 45% in 1997 and above or equal to 
40% in 2003.
07 : Ardèche
08 : Ardennes
09 : Ariège
12 : Aveyron
15 : Cantal
19 : Corrèze
22 : Côtes-d’Armor
23 : Creuse
29 : Finistère
32 : Gers
35 : Ille-et-Vilaine
39 : Jura
42 : Loire
43 : Haute-Loire
46 : Lot
48 : Lozère
49 : Maine-et-Loire
50 : Manche
52 : Haute-Marne
53 : Mayenne
55 : Meuse
56 : Morbihan
59 : Nord
62 : Pas-de-Calais
64 : Pyrénées-Atlantiques
65 : Hautes-Pyrénées
79 : Deux-Sèvres
81 : Tarn
82 : Tarn-et-Garonne
85 : Vendée
Departments with low schooling rates for two-years-olds:
Departments where the schooling rate was below 35% in 1997 and below 27% in 2003.
06 : Alpes-Maritimes
13 : Bouches-du-Rhône
2A : Corse-du-Sud
2B : Haute-Corse
21 : Côte d’or
27 : Eure
28 : Eure-et-Loir
31 : Haute-Garonne
33 : Gironde
37 : Indre-et-Loire
38 : Isère
45 : Loiret
57 : Moselle
60 : Oise
67 : Bas-Rhin
68 : Haut-Rhin
73 : Savoie
74 : Haute-Savoie
75 : Paris
76 : Seine-Maritime
77 : Seine-et-Marne
78 : Yvelines
83 : Var
84 : Vaucluse
87 : Haute-Vienne
89 : Yonne
90 : Territoire de Belfort
91 : Essonne
92 : Hauts-de-Seine
93 : Seine-Saint-Denis
94 : Val-de-Marne
95 : Val-d’Oise
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Table  11:  Ordinary least  square  and  Two-stage  least  square  estimates  of  the  effect  of 
having more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the mother 
lives in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high/low
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,501 0,014         
(0,013)
0,006         
(0,018)
-0,264         
(0,022)
0,402         
(1,384)
0,539 0,021         
(0,010)
-0,018         
(0,014)
-0,258         
(0,019)
-0,736         
(0,687)
28,3 0,014         
(0,013)
0,518         
(0,943)
-4,137         
(1,407)
12,400         
(36,402)
29,0 0,021         
(0,010)
-0,640         
(0,699)
-4,506         
(1,147)
-25,267         
(28,183)
7245 7245 7245 7245 7245
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Women with a spouse
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
High rate
Low rate
B. Results for hours / week
High rate
Low rate
N
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort 
and sex of first and second child.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children.
Main effect for the schooling rate at two-years-old is included in the equation.
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Table 12: Difference between the theoretical and the observed number of ‘twins-2’ 
Theoretical 
number of 
Twins-2  in 
our sample
Observed 
number of 
Twins-2
Khi-
squared 
statistic
1365,54 1346 0,280
2305,46 2325 0,166
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
High rate
Low rate
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two 
children.
Differences  in  means for  demographic  variables  by  ‘same sex’ for  mothers  living in a 
department where the schooling rate for two-years-olds is high
Age Age at first birth
Age at 
second 
birth
French 
nationality
Age at the 
end of 
studies
Diploma High rate
MS (1) 30,2169   (0,0832)
23,8165   
(0,0866)
27,1233   
(0,0885)
0,9562   
(0,0056)
18,8085   
(0,1157)
0,1761   
(0,0104)
1,0000   
(0,0000)
DS  
(2) 30,2172   
(0,0863)
23,7079   
(0,0914)
27,1364   
(0,0916)
0,9637   
(0,0051)
18,6756   
(0,0743)
0,1846   
(0,0106)
1,0000   
(0,0000)
Diff -0,0003   
(0,1199)
0,1086   
(0,1259)
-0,0131   
(0,1274)
-0,0075   
(0,0076)
0,1329   
(0,1375)
-0,0085   
(0,0148)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
(1): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are same sex.
(2): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are different sex.
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children who live in a department where the schooling rate for two-
years-old is high.
Var.
Differences  in  means for  demographic  variables  by  ‘same sex’ for  mothers  living in a 
department where the schooling rate for two-years-olds is low
Age Age at first birth
Age at 
second 
birth
French 
nationality
Age at the 
end of 
studies
Diploma Low rate
MS (1) 30,6194   (0,0637)
24,0865   
(0,0726)
27,5837   
(0,0692)
0,8718   
(0,0069)
18,8696   
(0,1194)
0,2409   
(0,0089)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
DS  
(2) 30,5856   
(0,0648)
24,0279   
(0,0741)
27,6072   
(0,0707)
0,8818   
(0,0068)
18,9648   
(0,1303)
0,2440   
(0,0091)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
Diff 0,0337   
(0,0908)
0,0586   
(0,1037)
-0,0235   
(0,0990)
-0,0100   
(0,0097)
-0,0953   
(0,1767)
-0,0032   
(0,0127)
0,0000   
(0,0000)
(1): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are same sex.
(2): sub sample of mothers whose two eldest children are different sex.
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Var.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children who live in a department where the schooling rate for two-
years-old is low.
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Table  13:  Ordinary least  square  and  Two-stage  least  square  estimates  of  the  effect  of 
having more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the mother 
lives in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high/low, sub sample of 
fathers
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,989 0,004         
(0,014)
-0,006         
(0,004)
-0,001         
(0,006)
-0,311         
(0,448)
0,990 0,016         
(0,012)
0,002         
(0,004)
-0,006         
(0,005)
0,027         
(0,285)
39,1 0,004         
(0,014)
-0,676         
(0,714)
-0,615         
(0,923)
-28,502         
(30,408)
39,0 0,016         
(0,012)
-0,228         
(0,570)
-0,986         
(0,793)
-13,430         
(23,555)
5563 5563 5563 5563 5563
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
N
Sample: men with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children.
High rate
Low rate
Low rate
B. Results for hours / week
A. Results for work for pay
High rate
Dependant variable:
Men with a spouse
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort 
and sex of first and second child.
Main effect for the schooling rate at two-years-old is included in the equation.
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Table  14:  Ordinary least  square  and  Two-stage  least  square  estimates  of  the  effect  of 
having more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the mother 
lives in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high/low, sample of 
mothers with a child aged two to ten
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Same sex
0,627 0,018         
(0,007)
0,001         
(0,008)
-0,343         
(0,009)
0,100         
(0,476)
0,625 0,041         
(0,005)
-0,029         
(0,006)
-0,334         
(0,008)
-0,662         
(0,154)
29,1 0,018         
(0,007)
-0,321         
(0,384)
-4,324         
(0,491)
-9,674         
(11,361)
29,6 0,041         
(0,005)
-0,169         
(0,300)
-3,173         
(0,420)
-3,767         
(8,504)
33270 33270 33270 33270 33270
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Main effect for the schooling rate at two-years-old is included in the equation.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children.
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort 
and sex of first and second child.
Women with a spouse
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
High rate
Low rate
B. Results for hours / week
High rate
Low rate
N
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Table  15:  Ordinary least  square  and  Two-stage  least  square  estimates  of  the  effect  of 
having more than two children on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the mother 
lives in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high/low
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 2 
children)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Twins-2
0,501 0,879         
(0,070)
-0,159         
(0,102)
-0,264         
(0,022)
-0,170         
(0,132)
0,539 0,881         
(0,047)
-0,228         
(0,068)
-0,258         
(0,019)
-0,265         
(0,083)
28,3 0,879         
(0,070)
11,711         
(6,028)
-4,137         
(1,407)
13,261         
(7,183)
29,0 0,881         
(0,047)
4,062         
(3,873)
-4,506         
(1,147)
4,194         
(4,502)
7245 7245 7245 7245 7245
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least two children.
Women with a spouse
Dependant variable:
A. Results for work for pay
High rate
Low rate
B. Results for hours / week
High rate
Low rate
N
Other covariates are age, age at first and second birth, diploma, nationality, cohort 
and sex of first and second child.
Main effect for the schooling rate at two-years-old is included in the equation.
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Table  16:  Ordinary least  square  and  Two-stage  least  square  estimates  of  the  effect  of 
having more than one child on labour supply conditionally to the fact that the mother lives 
in a department where the schooling rate for two-year-olds is high/low
Average
1st stage 
(More 
than 1 
child)
Reduced 
form OLS
2SLS          
Twins-1
0,653 0,520         
(0,060)
-0,344         
(0,072)
-0,283         
(0,012)
-0,572         
(0,098)
0,680 0,627         
(0,038)
-0,237         
(0,046)
-0,241         
(0,011)
-0,413         
(0,067)
29,2 0,520         
(0,060)
2,139         
(4,439)
-2,770         
(0,611)
3,178         
(5,684)
30,4 0,627         
(0,038)
1,184         
(2,607)
-1,966         
(0,538)
1,793         
(3,349)
13615 13615 13615 13615 13615
Source: labour force surveys 1990-2002, Insee.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
B. Results for hours / week
Women with a spouse
Sample: women with a spouse aged 21 to 35 with at least one child.
A. Results for work for pay
High rate
Low rate
Dependant variable:
High rate
Low rate
N
Other covariates are age, age at first birth, diploma, nationality, cohort.
Main effect for the schooling rate at two-years-old is included in the equation.
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